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1. Introduction 
On 28th March 2017, the Malaysian actress and celebrity Sarah Lian shared an 
Instagram post of a national school exam paper 
(https://www.facebook.com/imSarahLian/photos/a.180042060049.162621.39954720
049/10155066055665050/?type=3&theater). This test required primary pupils to 
match pictures of places of worship, such as a church, mosque, Buddhist temple and 
Hindu temple, to a corresponding list of first names.  In the ‘comments’ section of her 
Facebook page, another citizen shared a photo of a page from a national textbook 
that similarly required students to match pictures of four named children with a 
religion. Sarah Lian was outraged by this, as she saw it as a state strategy to 
indoctrinate children into absorbing narrow stereotypical identities. She railed against 
the idea that Malaysian children are being “reminded what box they fit in”. The post 
was shared multiple times, and a discussion ensued on whether such exam 
questions could be considered racist or not.  
The outcry and debate over whether such stereotyping was accurate or even useful 
to teach to children sheds light on a shift in some Malaysians’ perception of their 
identity. Ethnicity is a prominent marker of identity in Malaysia, with the population 
classified as those considered indigenous, (known as bumiputeras, which translates 
to “sons of the soil”), and of whom the Malays are the majority; and then the Chinese 
and Indians.1 As evident from the test papers, religion too, is a significant marker of 
identity. In particular, there is an overlap between ethnicity and religion, where 
Malays are automatically conferred as Muslims and therefore assume an ethno-
religious label, and as such the Malay ethnic identity has become synonymous with 
Islam. 2  However, in line with the ideology of such nation-building development 
programmes such as Vision 2020 and 1Malaysia3 which propagate the notion of 
“universal citizenship as the primary marker of Malaysian identity” (Noor, 2013:90), 
                                                          
1Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristic Report 2010, 2011. 
2This will be discussed in the chapter 2. 
3 Vision 2020 was introduced by Prime Minister Mahathir in 1991 and aimed to make Malaysia a fully 
modernised country by 2020. One of the ways this was to be achieved was by overcoming ethnic 
divisions and establishing a united Malaysian nation. See 
http://www.isis.org.my/attachments/Vision%202020%20complete.pdf More recently, 1Malaysia was 
introduced in 2010 by current Prime Minsiter Najib Razak, and seeks to make Malaysia a harmonious, 
economically prosperous nation with a national sense of identity. See  http://www.1malaysia.com.my/ 
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there seems to be desire to move away from such ethnic and religious classifications 
of citizens to embrace a more “nationalist, inclusive, non-sectarian identity” (Noor, 
2013:26). This can be seen in recent national elections, where the traditionally rigid 
voting patterns along ethnic lines has seen a reduced ethnic bias, especially the 
2008 election (Brown, 2005; Holst, 2012; Lian & Appudari, 2011; Maznah, 2005; 
Moten, 2009; Noor, 2013). Observers have cited this shift as evidence of a sea 
change in Malaysians’ conception of their identity, as urban Malaysian citizens 
embrace a new, singular national identity. 
However, the fact that these test papers were being used in national schools 
indicates incoherence in Malaysia’s state ideology. How can it advocate a universal, 
singular, non-sectarian notion of citizenship, and yet simultaneously promote ethno-
religious profiling for school children? These contradictions are evident within the 
government too, as the Deputy Prime Minister Muhyuddin Yasin claimed to feel “an 
ethnic Malay first, and a Malaysian second” (Noor, 2013:98), which is at odds with 
the national vision of Malaysia promoted by the current 1Malaysia government 
programme. 
 
Aim and Research Questions 
My thesis aims to investigate these contradictory threads in the official state-
sanctioned narrative by examining how identity is perceived and articulated by 
members of the Malaysian middle class. The middle class is often considered at the 
vanguard of social change (Hewison, Robison, all cited in Case, 2013:11; 
Huntington, cited in Case, 2013:13; Thompson, 2007), and the Bersih movement, 
which seeks to reform Malaysian politics, has inspired hundreds of Malaysians to 
take to the streets in protest.4 Indeed, observers have credited the Bersih movement 
as contributing to the recent shifting voting patterns in elections away from ethnic 
allegiances (Tong, 2016; Weiss, 2009; Welsh, 2011), though a multi-ethnic party has 
yet to successfully win an election, which indicates such striving for change is limited 
or restrained. What the movement does symbolise, though, is the potential for 
                                                          
4 Bersih, or the ‘Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections’, was formed in 2005 and describes itself as a 
civil society movement which seeks electoral change and good governance in Malaysia (Bersih 2.0, 
n.d). The middle class membership of Bersih will be discussed in chapter 3. 
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change, and a shift in discourse that moves beyond ethnicity to class (Rahman, 
2007). I propose to examine the attitudes and impact of the Malaysian middle class 
in relation to transcending ethnic preoccupations and formulations of identity, by 
using the Bersih movement as a framework of analysis. However, I will not be 
investigating the Bersih movement per se, or evaluating how successful it has been 
in achieving its aims. Rather, I will investigate its symbolic meaning as an example of 
middle class political mobilisation, alongside attitudes from a sample of the Malay 
and Chinese Malaysian middle class, in an attempt to ascertain the processes at 
work and any potential shifts in perceptions of identity in Malaysia. 
The Sarah Lian incident indicates that issues regarding race and ethnicity remain 
controversial and ever present in Malaysia, and in order to better understand any 
potential shifts in perceptions of identity, it is important firstly to understand the 
context and endurance of such ethnic categories of identity. This informs my first 
research question: Why does ethnic consciousness endure in Malaysia? The 
outcry and disgust generated by citizens in response to the questions in the national 
test papers indicates that there may be a change in attitudes towards ethnic 
identification, in a quest for a more universal, non-ethnically defined national identity, 
which leads to my second research question: Is the emergence of a new Middle 
Class fostering class solidarity that transcends ethnic consciousness? And if 
so, a third research question will be explored: What conceptions of a new national 
identity are formulated to replace ethnic categorisation?  
I hope to provide possible reasons why ethnic identification remains so stubborn in 
Malaysia, and to examine how the possibility of middle class affiliation offers an 
alternative way of imagining identity by transcending previous ethno-religious 
classifications, and moving to a sense of universal citizenship. This has implications 
on how Malaysian society will develop, either by compounding the existing distinction 
between groups based on ethnicity and influenced by Islam, or with a potential shift 
away from these previous ethno-religious categories towards a more fluid, 
encompassing ‘Malaysian’ identity. 
This positions my thesis in the extensive research already conducted on identity 
politics. There have been calls to move away from ethnic analyses into Malaysian 
society, as the persistent focus on race can be seen to perpetuate a discourse 
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anchored in ethnic framings of identity, and therefore denies alternative possibilities 
of imagining citizenship and society (Holst, 2012; Mandal, 2003). However, as 
Rahman points out, Malaysia is the only country to have an official discourse based 
on ‘race’ (2009), and the outcry about the exam questions on ethno-religious 
stereotypes indicates that this cannot be dismissed from any analysis of Malaysian 
society or politics. In addition, the role of class and wealth inequality has not featured 
much in the socio-political literature of Malaysia (Khalid, 2014:22), and my research 
locates itself in the juncture between race and class.  In formulating a new sense of 
national identity, my research is also positioned in the current debates and theories 
about forms of citizenship. In order to better orientate my research within these 
streams, I will elaborate on them below. 
 
Identity as Belonging 
An abundance of scholarly work has been produced on identity. Brubaker and 
Cooper claim the term is overemployed, and advocate abandoning the concept 
altogether due to its outwardly essential and knowable, but internally ambiguous and 
contradictory nature (2000). The convoluted and tired attempts to fix identity as a 
useful analytical category are raised by Stuart Hall in his essay “Who Needs 
Identity?” (1996). Hall concludes, however, that “the question, and the theorization, 
of identity is a matter of considerable political significance” (1996:16), and this 
means it cannot be dismissed or glossed over. Therefore, in attempting to formulate 
a useful definition of identity, current debates are increasingly specifying the concept 
of belonging as a useful framework of analysis (Jones & Kryzanowski, 2008:40). 
Croucher defines the ‘politics of belonging’ as referring to “the process of individuals, 
groups, societies and polities defining, negotiating, promoting, rejecting, violating and 
transcending the boundaries of identities and belonging” (2003:41), and I am 
interested in these processes in the Malaysian context. More specifically, belonging 
denotes an emotional attachment and the feeling of being at home (Yuval-Davis, 
2011:10); it goes to the core of what is essentially meant by identity, and 
accommodates a range of attachments, subject feelings, preferences and 
memberships, including how the ‘banal, mundane’ ways of belonging are expressed 
(Billig, cited in Jones & Kryzanowski, 2008:42). This makes it a useful lens of 
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analysis for my research, which centres on individuals’ personal attitudes and 
observations about their sense of belonging in Malaysian society, and how they 
position themselves and others in relation to existing collectives or communities 
(Jones & Kryzanowski, 2008:44). It is the conception of identity as relational, as 
conceived of by Malaysians at both a micro and macro-level, which is salient to my 
research.   
 
The ‘Blood’ versus Social Constructivism Debate 
Race and ethnicity are commonly ascribed features of identity, and there is a 
substantial literature devoted to analyzing these concepts (Holst, 2012:6), especially 
when discussing Malaysia. Scholars have traditionally distinguished between the 
meaning of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ as the former being a biological concept with origins 
in colonial pseudo-science (Mandal, 2003:52), whilst ethnicity has tended to replace 
it as a modern term used to describe observable, potentially constructed differences 
between people (Hirschman, 2004:410). However, in Bahasa Malay, the word 
bangsa is used to denote both race and ethnicity (Holst, 2012:1),5 and therefore I will 
use them flexibly for the purpose of my thesis. In addition, two key, albeit contentious 
notions of ethnic identification are germane to my research as they relate to how 
Malaysians potentially conceive of themselves: primordial and situationalist 
conceptions of ethnic identification. Primordial explanations conceive of ethnicity as 
a fixed, essential identity that is recognisable by physical and genetic attributes such 
as skin colour, blood ties, as well as cultural attributes such as language and religion 
(Chee, 2010:4), and this conception has its roots in early anthropological studies. 
This contrasts with post-structural, situationalist conceptions of ethnic identity, which 
are viewed as socially constructed and contingent, and are therefore flexible and 
shifting. More recent scholarship posits the compatibility of both conceptions (Brown, 
2003:6; Ratcliffe, 2004:30, Shamsul, 1996), and I will argue that in the case of 
Malaysia, both conceptions have political currency. 
 
 
                                                          
5 As well as nation, state, tribe, community or group (Leow, 2016:189) 
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Citizenship as the Everyday 
The potential formulation of a new sense of belonging based on more universalistic 
norms instead of ethnic ones locates my research in the current debates on 
citizenship theory. Scholars have observed that the type of citizenship practiced in 
Southeast Asia varies to that in European societies and that there is a need for 
research to examine the specific context and conditions of the region in order to gain 
a better understanding of this (Berenschot et al., 2016; Embong, 2001). Indeed, 
many normative concepts such as ‘citizenship’ or ‘democracy’ have grounding in 
European scholarship, but this is not to say that they should exclusively be defined 
within such parametres, especially when applied to other regions with their own 
histories and political processes. An example of this can be seen in the arguments of 
the Malaysian scholar, Fadlulah Jamel, who argues that such supposedly ‘Western’ 
concepts such as ‘citizenship’ have a grounding in Islamic texts (Kloos & 
Berenschot, 2016:192). The point here is not to debate the legitimacy of his claims, 
but rather to acknowledge the possibility of new conceptions of citizenship that 
originate from different contexts. Rather than providing a definition of citizenship 
against which Malaysia’s middle class can be measured, I advocate Berenschot et 
al.’s advice to “re-examine the normative connotations inherent in our 
conceptualization of the citizenship ideal…[by starting] from the everyday state-
citizen interactions rather than abstract idealized forms” (2016:4). Indeed, Shotter 
claims that the “basis of citizenship must be located in the everyday, social life, as 
this is where feelings are” (1993:131), and this ties the notion of belonging as the 
essence of identity to the grander, formal notion of citizenship. In recognising that the 
postcolonial Malaysian state has developed along its own particular set of historical 
and social conditions, my research strives to make inferences based on citizens’ 
experiences and observations, alongside historical contextualisation. 
However, I will present a general observation regarding the nature of citizenship in 
Southeast Asia. Whilst European models of citizenship are centred on impersonal, 
neutral and supposedly equal interactions between citizens and the state, in 
Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, there is a greater emphasis on personal, 
clientalistic relationships, which foregrounds identify as a key determinate of access 
to rights and benefits (Berenschot et al., 2016:18). This will be seen in my research 
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in the form of ‘differentiated citizenship’, which is the result of ethnically defined 
economic policies and political systems.  
 
Outline 
My thesis will firstly give the background to the construction of an ethnic system of 
organisation in Malaysia, with its roots in colonial categorisations and then as part of 
a post-independence nation-building strategy (chapter 2). Then, it will examine the 
construction of the middle class in Malaysia, particularly the ‘New Malay’ middle 
class, which is the product of affirmative action and differentiated citizenship. I will 
analyse this development within the framework of modernisation theory, which 
asserts that the rise of a middle class produces an increased drive for democracy, 
and with this, a shift away from ethnic or communal group structures towards an 
ideal, national sense of identity; an attitude that is embodied by the Bersih civil 
society movement (chapter 3). In analysing this development within the framework of 
modernisation theory, I do not mean to suggest a teleological view of development, 
which imposes a Eurocentric ideal of citizenship onto the Malaysian experience. 
Rather, in using modernisation theory as a starting point, I feel it is useful to compare 
and understand how, where and why the Malaysian experience might diverge from 
the course plotted by European development, and propose to do this by generating 
data based on citizen interactions and opinions. In chapter 4, I describe my approach 
to this research, where I use interviews with six Malaysians as well as survey results 
to gain an insight into middle class attitudes towards ethnicity, class and the potential 
for change in Malaysia. I present and discuss my findings in chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
where each chapter corresponds to a research question. Finally, in my conclusion, I 
address my research questions and discuss what implications, if any, this has on 
Malaysia’s future nature-building project. 
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2. Identity Formation in Malaysia 
In order to evaluate potential shifts in grassroots attitudes towards the traditional 
ethno-religious organising principles of Malaysian society, we need first to 
understand the origin of the persistent emphasis on ethnic categorisation; to view it 
in its historical context, as this has had significant implications on identity-politics and 
nation-building in Malaysian society today. 
 
Colonial Identity Formation: The Making of ‘Race’ 
““Race…has been very much a state project”. 
(Mandal, 2003:54) 
Substantial historical literature has already been devoted to locating Malaysia’s 
current racial classifications in its colonial origins: 
“Almost every writer who addresses the “race problem” or the “plural society” 
of Peninsular Malaysia suggests the roots of contemporary ethnic divisions 
and antagonisms were formed during the colonial era” (Hirschman, 
1986:331).  
Although scholars disagree on the impact of colonial classifications, with some 
claiming these classifications were passively received and internalised by colonial 
subjects (Derichs cited in Haque, 2003:244; Pannu, 2011), whilst others resent this 
simplifying and the lack of agency it implies (Ashcroft, 1989; Cooper, 2005), there is 
consensus that the colonial regime officialised racial categories, and that this has a 
legacy in modern Malaysia: if it did not wholly create them, it at least “reinforced an 
ethnic-centred construction of identity” (Nah, 2003:516). 
Prior to European colonialism, Southeast Asia was already heavily engaged in trade 
and commerce, as it was strategically located between India and China. Port cities 
like Melaka were well established by the seventeenth century, and as a result there 
was a thriving cosmopolitanism amongst the commercial class:  
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“…foreign merchants were constantly being incorporated into local society 
through the medium of marriage and adoption of local language and dress 
norms” (Reid, 2015:92). 
This is supported by Hirschman, who does not deny there was ethnic conflict and 
segregation in pre-colonial times, but claims there was more acculturation and 
acceptance of differences, and the potential for more cross-mingling (Hirschman, 
1986:356; 1995:29). 
European expansion and domination of the region brought about increased racial 
awareness and suspicion. In British Malaya in the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
large numbers of Chinese and Indians were brought in to build up a cheap labor 
force (Cheah, 2009:35; Hirschman 1986:356; Khoo, 2009:14). The British imported 
notions of ‘race’ and racial superiority based on Social Darwinism, which encouraged 
the measurement and classification of ‘races’ on a supposed scientific basis. Racial 
hierarchy was viewed as natural and measurable, and such ethnic labelling was 
further reified by the introduction of the first comprehensive census in 1891, which 
listed the various Asian categories of races as: ‘Chinese’, ‘Malays & other’, ‘Tamils & 
other’, and ‘Other Nationalities’ (Hirschman, 1987:571). However, the fluidity of the 
concept of ‘race’ is evident by the changing categories in subsequent censuses 
(Hirschman, 1987), which indicates the arbitrariness and constructed concept of 
‘race’.  
Nevertheless, the colonial census persisted in attempting to quantify, classify and  
‘fix’ identities (Anderson, 2004:166). Many scholars argue that such racial 
classifications were introduced as a deliberate means of controlling the population by 
the British: 
“The manner in which they sought to establish their control was to categorize 
this new social world in terms that would allow for the establishment for the 
effective establishment of their administration” (Pannu, 2011:44).  
As a result, ethnic-based legislation which dealt with each group separately was 
introduced (Nah, 2003:516), and communities that might have mingled and merged 
were now officially segregated along racial lines (Hirschman, 1986:353). This 
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fostered mutual suspicion between the groups, and could be seen to exemplify the 
renowned ‘divide and rule’ strategy of the British (Holst, 2012:84).  
In fixing identity, characteristics and capacities of each race were ascribed. This is 
illustrated in Alatas’ influential work The Myth of the Lazy Native, which draws on 
centuries of colonial sources to show the construction of these racial categories, and 
how they have a direct legacy on Malaysian society today (cited in Lian, 1997:62). 
The production of knowledge by the coloniser is evident from a colonial guidebook 
for British officers: The Handbook of Malaya (German, 1935:342). 6  The section 
entitled ‘Population’ describes the inhabitants, and it appears after the chapter on 
‘Flora and Fauna’ and before “Geography and Minerals”, indicating how people were 
classified in the same way as plants and wildlife, and illustrates the As well as 
focusing on origins, physical descriptions and habits, this source emphasises the 
character traits of the Malays as lazy: “…the Malay has doubtless much to learn in 
respect of the value of concentrated effort and firmness of purpose” yet also as 
possessing “innate cheerfulness” (1935:31). In contrast, colonial sources determine 
the Chinese characteristics as industrious, displaying “extraordinary determination 
and perseverance” (Hirschman, 1986:346), but greedy: “…wherever there is money 
to be made, you can be sure that the Chinaman is not far away” (Wright and Reid, 
cited in Hirschman, 1986:346). As many were brought to Malaya by the colonial 
administration, they were viewed as temporary residents (Hirschman, 1986:353), 
whilst the Malays were considered indigenous and therefore more ‘legitimate’ 
members. These colonial classifications in Malaysia formed stereotypes based on 
‘race’ (Jesudason, 2001:67; Nair, 2009:86), as well as determining the level of 
legitimacy of each race within the state. This has left a residue in postcolonial 
Malaysia. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Interestingly, Hirschman observes that there was a lack of such character descriptions in earlier 
colonial sources (Hirschman, 1986:342). 
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Postcolonial Identity Formation: Enduring Ethnic Consciousness 
“Malaysia is a nation of ethnics rather than a nation of citizens”  
(Ong, 2009:476) 
Since independence, ethnicity has still been used as a marker of identity in Malaysia: 
socially, politically and economically. It is reified through the population census, 
which continues to reflect primordial classifications of ‘race’. In the most recent 
census, the Chinese and Indians are each still classified as a homogenous, 
monolithic group, whilst the Malays have been subsumed under the broader banner 
of ‘bumiputera’ (Population Distribution, 2011). This merging of the previously 
labelled ‘aboriginal’ races with the Malays into one category on the basis of 
indigenity emphasises their legitimacy, whilst continuing to position the Chinese and 
Indians as non-natives.  
Furthermore, the position of these groups has been administratively defined and 
officialised in the Malaysian Constitution, which privileges the bumiputeras, 
especially the Malays, whilst recognising ‘peripherally’ the rights and status of other 
ethnic groups (Balasubramaniam, 2007:37; Shamsul, 1996:483). Key tenets of being 
‘Malay’ were sanctified as the normative national identity, so that Bahasa Malay was 
chosen as the official and national language (Malaysia: Federal Constitution, 
1957:Article 152.1); Islam was adopted as the official state religion (Malaysia: 
Federal Constitution, 1957:Article 3.1); and the rights and special position of Malays 
and other bumiputeras were specified and protected:  
“it shall be the responsibility….to safeguard the special position of the Malays 
and natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate 
interests of other communities in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article” (Malaysia: Federal Constitution 1957:Article 153.1). 
All of these officially enshrined tenets cemented the ethnic differences between the 
groups, separating the indigenous or ‘native’ citizens from the ‘non-native’ ones, and 
furthermore, positioning them into a hierarchy of belonging based on indigenity.  
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An Ethnocratic State 
However, the most significant way ethnic separation has been consolidated and 
reinforced in post-independence Malaysia is by its unique, racially defined political 
system, which underpins the entire society: “the formation of the state itself is largely 
founded upon ethnic politics and characterized as an “ethnocratic state” “ (Haque, 
2003:240). On negotiating independence for Malaysia, the British initially proposed a 
constitution that integrated the Chinese and Indians into a single Malaysian polity 
(Omar, 2009:45), thereby not recognising the difference between Malay and non-
Malay groups, and conferring equal citizenship rights to the non-Malays (Pietsch & 
Clark, 2014:307). However, this was rejected by the Malay nationalists, who feared 
Chinese and non-Malay domination, and sought to have their indigenity recognised 
(Cheah, 2002:2; Neo, 2006:96). The resulting political system since the 1950s has 
been a coalition between three ethnically defined parties (Neo, 2006:95): the United 
Malays Organisation (UMNO); the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malaysia Indian Congress (MIC), of which UMNO is the dominant 
(Balasubramaniam, 2007:37), and has shaped the postcolonial political landscape. 
This party, the Barisan Nasional (BN), has been in power continuously since 
independence, having won every election. This communal system is indicative of the 
notion that people are primarily defined and united by their ethnic background, and 
the BN mobilises its support along ethnic lines  (Mandal, 2003:64), which serves to 
perpetually reinforce ethnicity in Malaysian society (Tan, 2012:6). 
 
Religion and Ethnicity: Islam as Consolidating Malayness  
Although a secular state, Islam has played an increasingly important role in identity-
politics in Malaysia (Kortteinen, cited in Pietsch & Clarke, 2014:312). There is 
evidence that religion was a significant marker of identity in pre-colonial times 
(Anderson, 2004), but during British colonialisation religion lost its primacy as ‘race’ 
became the governing marker of identity. This was maintained after independence, 
as evidenced by the census and Constitution. However, religion, and specifically 
Islam, has become an increasingly significant marker of Malay and national identity:  
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“Since the 1980s... religious identity appears to have replaced ethnicity as the 
central element of nation identity as the society has been 
systematically…Islamised” (Bar & Govindasamy, 2010:93). 
This is visible by the rising popularity of Islamic dress, Islamic schools and 
universities, the establishment of Shari’ah judicial courts, and the introduction of 
Islamic banking (Abbott & Gregorios-Pippas, 2010; Noor, 2013), and the rise of 
Islamist parties such as Parti al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), which has compelled 
UMNO to adopt a more Islamic platform in order to secure the Malay vote (Noor, 
2013:91), even resulting in Prime Minister Mahathir boldly declaring that Malaysia 
was an Islamic State in 2002. 
This can be attributed to part of the wider global trend of Islamisation as a reaction to 
the neoliberal, capitalist, developmental model followed by many postcolonial states 
(Noor, 2013:91), but in the Malaysian context it is also tied into the notion of 
‘Malayness’. The original markers of ‘Malayness’ were language, religion and adit 
(local customs), as cited in the Constitution: “Malay” is defined as “a person who 
professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to 
Malay custom” (Malaysia: Federal Constitution, 1957:Article 160). However, 
language and customs have been eroded by urbanisation and globalisation and no 
longer uniquely serve to identify Malayness (Neo, 2014:766), therefore leaving Islam 
as the main marker of Malay identity.  
This shift to religiosity has consolidated the Malay identity and made it synonymous 
with being a Muslim. Indeed, all Malays are born Muslims, and cannot change their 
religion (Neo, 2006:96; Pietsch & Clark, 2014:306). The synonymity of Malay 
ethnicity with Islam is evident in the Islamic conversion ceremony, which is referred 
to as ‘Masuk Malay’: literally to become a Muslim is to ‘enter into becoming a Malay’, 
and illustrates the interchangeability of ethnicity with religion (Tan, 2000:451; Holst, 
2012:107). Converting to Islam, along with adoption of the Malay language and 
customs, is sufficient to qualify for the ethnic label of ‘Malay’ (Hirschman, 1987:555). 
Islam is therefore a vital, though not usually sufficient, ingredient to obtaining the 
Malay ethnic label. Whilst the increased prominence of Islam has complicated 
identity-politics in Malaysia, it serves to consolidate the Malay ethnic identity, rather 
than to supplant it. Ethnicity can still be seen to be a more prominent marker of 
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identity than religion in Malaysia, and continues to position other non-Muslim, non-
Malay citizens as deviations from the essential national identity.  
 
The New Economic Policy (NEP)  
One of the most startling ways the postcolonial government has cemented ethnic 
consciousness is through the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
This policy, and its modified successor the New Development Plan (NDP), 
implements and endorses affirmative action for the Malays and other bumiputeras, to 
the exclusion of the Chinese and Indian Malaysian citizens. Initially conceived as a 
30-year plan, it still endures today, and has had a huge impact on the socio-
economic and cultural development of Malaysia and its citizens. 
The rationale for such a policy was a reaction to the May 1969 race riots between 
ethnic Malays and Chinese, following the street celebrations of the success of the 
Chinese Alliance party in gaining a majority of seats in the recent elections. This led 
to the interpretation that economic disparity led to ethnic violence, and the NEP was 
conceived as a strategy to redress the economic inequality between the Chinese and 
the Malays. Specifically, its two goals were to restructure the economy to eliminate 
inequality and eradicate poverty (Ratuva, 2013:197; Torii, 1997:212), by introducing 
restrictions on non-bumiputeras in employment, education and corporate ownership, 
thereby lifting up 
“the economic positions of the bumiputera, and particularly the Malays at its 
core, whose economic positions were historically inferior, to bring them 
abreast of Chinese and other ethnic groups in Malaysia” (Torii, 1997:212). 
This has led to it being labelled as the “Malay-first” policy by some analysts (Horii 
cited in Torii, 1997:210), and although it might not have eliminated inequality or 
completely eradicated poverty, it has been successful in reducing overall poverty 
(Khalid, 2014:2; Ratuva, 2013:217).7 
                                                          
7 There have been debates about the reliability of data (see Jomo, 2004:19), but according to Khalid 
(2014:92) and Ratuva, (2013:200) the overall poverty level dropped from ~49.3% in 1970 to ~16% by 
1990. 
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The programme was justified as a solution to inherited ethnic disparity, which had its 
origins in colonial capitalism (Torii, 1997:196).  Under British colonialism, there was 
an ethnic division of labour whereby each ethnic group was designated a particular 
function: 
“The occupation of the Malay is…agricultural and…fishing…the Chinese form 
the bulk of the trading, shopkeeping and labouring classes… the Tamils, 
Telugus and Malayalis who migrate to Malay are of the labouring class” 
(German, 1935:32). 
Therefore, the impact of colonial structuring according to race and occupation has 
endured in postcolonial Malaysia, as the NEP justifies the preferential treatment of 
indigenous groups in an attempt to engineer an equal society and ensure peace and 
stability, thereby producing differentiated citizenship. Additionally, the persistent 
focus on ethnicity as criteria for potential rights, allocations and economic 
advancements, ensures ethnicity remains a potent marker of identity in Malaysia, 
just as it was under British colonialism.  
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3. Modernisation Theory and The Middle Class 
In this chapter, I outline modernisation theory which predicts that democracy and a 
sense of universal citizenship is cultivated by the middle class as a result of 
economic development. I then focus specifically on some general characteristics of 
the Malaysian middle class, and discuss two groups within this class: the New 
Malays and the Chinese, and the impact the NEP has had on their development and 
position in Malaysian society. Finally, I present the Bersih movement as an example 
of Malaysian middle class activism that is potentially pushing back against the 
constraints of authority-imposed ethnic identification. 
 
Modernisation Theory 
A significant American theory of the emergence of a middle class developed in the 
1950s-60s, and asserts that with increased economic development and urbanisation, 
a middle class develops that will have universalistic concerns and seek democracy. 
This theory aligns modernisation alongside democracy, with a resulting focus on 
human rights and greater civic participation from the middle class (Case, 2013:12; 
Chong, 2005a:47, Embong, 2001:15). The reasons for this are due to globalisation 
and capitalist processes, whereby social relations are intensified globally due to the 
compression of time and space as a result of modernisation and technology 
(Giddens, in Salleh, 2000:146). As a result of economic development and increased 
wealth, people assume a more transnational identity (Gabriel, 2016) as they are 
exposed to the English language as a lingua franca, might have an overseas 
education or at least travel abroad, and increasingly share consumer habits and 
lifestyle aspirations (Chong, 2005b:578). As well as exhibiting capitalist concerns, it 
is assumed that the middle class in developing countries will also adopt an appetite 
for liberal democracy, and alongside this, an increased concern for universal 
citizenship and human rights, moving away from family or tribal allegiances. 
This modernisation theory has its origins in the 1950’s in the work of Lipset (1959), 
and Rostow (1960). However, it has had a recent revival moving away from its 
teleological, paternalistic, structural nature of analysis to a more agency-centred 
analysis that acknowledges that modernisation does not automatically guarantee 
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democracy, but results in ‘social and cultural changes that make democracy 
increasingly probable’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010:6). The civil protest movements in 
Southeast Asia, such as the ‘People’s Power’ revolution in the Philippines in 1986, 
the ‘Black May’ protests in Thailand in 1992, the Fall of the New Order in Indonesia 
in 1998, and more recently the Bersih movement in Malaysia, can be seen as 
exemplify modernisation theory, and in all these cases, it was mainly the middle 
class citizens of these countries that pushed for democratic change. 
However, many of these movements have not resulted in significant changes, 
resulting in ‘pseudo-democracies’ or ‘semi-democracies’ (Holst, 2012:62; Thompson, 
2007:1), characterised by voting in parliamentary elections but with severe 
restrictions on media, gerrymandering, vote buying and the de-legitimisation of 
opposition parties. Observers and theorists have become somewhat disappointed 
with the lack of sustained effort by the middle class in insisting on durable change 
and genuine democracy in these movements (Kessler, 2001:36). Adherents to 
modernisation theory often view it as essential that the middle class, as well as being 
a consumer class engaged in capitalist processes, should simultaneously exemplify 
a thirst for democracy. However, the Southeast Asian middle class, including the 
Malaysian middle class, does not seem to adhere to both aspects of the theory, as 
envisioned by their common combination of traditionalism and modernisation. This is 
encapsulated by the ‘Asian Values’ theory, exemplified very successfully by 
Singapore and extolled by its late Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, which posits that a 
Confucian ethos prioritising collectivity and harmony is conducive to economic 
growth.  
 
New Middle Class in Southeast Asia  
The ‘Middle Class’ can be defined according to a number of criteria: income, 
occupation, education, lifestyle and consumer choices, accent, and aspirations 
depending on the analytical focus. What is generally understood is that they are in 
the middle:  in-between the elites and the poor. For economic analysis, particularly 
for cross-country comparisons, class is measured in either absolute or relative terms 
related to average income (Who’s in the Middle?, 2009). Although this might be the 
most concrete way to define class as it is quantifiable, other scholars grounded in the 
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social sciences reject this empiricist-objectivist approach, claiming such 
concreteness is a fallacy (Parsons, cited in Kessler, 2001:32), and in simplifying the 
concept obscures the true nature of it. Thompson’s groundbreaking work adopted 
the view that class was not so much a structure, but a relationship, and focused on 
class-consciousness and individuals (Thompson, 1963). This makes class much 
more difficult to define or measure: Kessler points out the futility in trying to 
objectively  ‘fix’ a definition of class as it is a dynamic social process that is 
‘contingent, emergent, fluctuating, and not historically given’ (2001:33). As my 
research focuses on class as a social phenomenon, and in particular on individuals’ 
class-consciousness as it pertains to their sense of identity, no single definition of 
class will be offered, as this would be unhelpful and limiting. Rather, what is germane 
to my research is the characteristic of class as a ‘bounded phenomenon’, which 
similarly to ethnicity, operates as a marker of identity (Stockwell, 1982), determining 
who is included and excluded, and what allegiances are forged. 
There is a general acceptance that Malaysia has obtained a significant middle class 
through rapid economic development, whether this is measured by urbanization 
(Saravanamuttu, 2001), car and television ownership (Crouch, 1984), consumerist 
predilections and lifestyles (Saravanamuttu, 2009), employment categories 
(Embong, 1998) or income/consumption patterns (Key Indicators for Asia and the 
Pacific, 2010). However, what is also recognised is that there is a persistent rural-
urban gap (Khalid, 2014:xiv), and that the lowest economic groups tend to be the 
Malays and other bumiputeras (Rahman, 2009:429). This is despite more than 40 
years of affirmative action through the NEP and NDP, and is generally attributed to 
corruption, cronyism and poor implementation (Khalid, 2013:147; Milne, 1986:1373; 
Ratuva, 2013:212). 
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The NEP as Differentiated Citizenship 
“The fact of the matter is that inequality in Malaysia remains as much about 
race as it is about class”.      (Khalid, 2013:xiv) 
 
The New Malays 
One of the aims of the NEP was to create a bumiputera middle class, specifically a 
Malay middle class, and this can be seen to have been achieved by the creation of 
the Melayu Baru class (New Malays 8) (Chong, 2005a:50; Ratuva, 2013:201; Tan, 
2012:7). Data indicates that this new class is a successful product of state 
engineering and the NEP, as bumiputera equity ownership increased from 1.5% in 
1969 to 19.4% in 2006 (Gomez, 2009 cited in Ratuva, 2013), and bumiputeras 
working in white-collar professions increased from 4.9% in 1970 to 38.8% in 2005 
(Gomez, 2009 and Lee et al., 2010, both cited in Ratuva, 2013). Indeed, most 
government and statutory positions are dominated by bumiputeras (Tan, 2012:7). 
The emergence of this group was a specific goal of Prime Minister Mahathir in his 
Vision 2020 nation-building programme, and was seen to symbolise Malaysia’s 
transformation into a modern nation, as well as progress towards equalising 
economic disparity between the Chinese and Malays.  
Chong discusses the complexities of offering a rigid, precise definition of the New 
Malays (2005b) and summarises the various interpretations by scholars. Under 
conventional class theory analysis, the New Malays can be viewed as a capitalist 
class, embedded in the global capitalist system, in conjunction with Robison and 
Goodman’s definition of Asia’s ‘new rich’ (cited in Chong, 2005b:578). They are 
considered to be cosmopolitan, possessing English language skills, able to study 
and travel overseas, and therefore possess increasingly global cultural and 
consumption tastes (Chong, 2005b:578). 9  In terms of occupation, they are 
“professionals, managers, executives, skilled technicians… [and] corporate elites” 
                                                          
8  They are considered to be a ‘new’ class as they emerged from the rapid industrialisation and 
economic transformation of postcolonial Malaysia, and specifically from the benefits of the NEP. This 
contrasts with the pre-NEP Malay elite as described by Shamsul, as these were the Malay feudal and 
aristocratic class (Shamsul, 1999). 
9 However, the Malays and bumiputeras also make up the majority of poor Malaysians (Khalid, 2014). 
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(Chong, 2005b:580), with Shamsul arguing that political elites should also be 
included (1999:92). All of these characteristics imply a shift towards the global and 
transnational and therefore, a potential shift away from an ethnic, communal identity. 
The notion that the New Malays are not bound by ethnicity is promoted by 
Saravanamuttu, who claims that the new class-consciousness “carves out a 
discursive space that goes well beyond ethnic and communal issues” (2001:116). 
Other observers echo this sentiment: “[the New Malay] is not hung up on parochial, 
provincial issues like race and entitlements and finds his place in the world” 
(Asiaweek, cited in Chong, 2005b:573). In no longer being bound by ethnicity and 
seeking a more cosmopolitan, universal identity, and additionally being secure in 
having attained a middle class status, there is an implication that the New Malays 
potentially reject ethnically assigned entitlements and state benefits as epitomised by 
the NEP. 
Mahathir’s description of the New Malays as “modern, educated, disciplined, hard-
working, competitive” (Lian, 1997:74) locates them as an urban group, in contrast to 
rural Malays. This signifies a departure from the stereotype of the ‘lazy Malay’; a 
colonial determination that continues to have currency as exemplified in Mathathir’s 
book The Malay Dilemma (1970), where he criticises the passive, lazy 
characteristics of the Malays and seeks to create an entrepreneurial, dynamic Malay 
class. Whether the New Malays can be seen to be entrepreneurial or competitive is 
debatable, having been nurtured by state benefits and quotas. However, what is 
significant is that despite being the product of such benefits, there is evidence that 
the New Malays are seeking an alternative, non-ethnic based system of rights and 
benefits based on an idea of non-differentiated citizenship.  
The Non-Malays: Chinese Malaysians 
As the NEP was established in reaction to the perceived threat of Chinese economic 
and political domination, the impact of the policy on this segment of Malaysian 
society is important. In terms of economic gain, Chinese Malaysians have not 
completely lost their dominance despite the NEP restrictions (Crouch, 2001:241; 
Khalid, 2014:92; Ratuva, 2013:216). This is generally accounted for by the rapid 
growth and development of Malaysia (Crouch, 2001:239), though a culturalist 
argument is sometimes still cited, whereby the natural business acumen, 
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industriousness and strong familial ties of the Chinese has ensured their continued 
economic success, especially in diaspora communities (Harrell, 1985; Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988; Redding, 1990). In addition, some Chinese Malaysians have developed 
‘by-pass’ strategies to the NEP, such as the Malay-Chinese ‘Ali-Baba’ business 
arrangement whereby a Chinese Malaysian, unable to obtain a license for a 
business, runs the business and pays a Malay who has the license. These 
agreements are perceived to benefit both parties, but result in the Malay earning 
money from running a business without acquiring any business acumen, feeding into 
the ‘lazy Malay’ and ‘industrious Chinese’ ethnic stereotypes. Another strategy 
employed by the Chinese is pointed out by Khalid, who claims the Chinese impose 
discriminatory hiring practices such as insisting on Mandarin language skills to 
ensure Chinese Malaysian employment (2014:144). Indeed, some scholars have 
argued that the NEP has greatly benefitted the Chinese Malaysians (Ye, 2003), or at 
the very least, has not harmed their economic prospects (Hwang and Sadiq, 2010). 
Therefore, it cannot be claimed that the NEP has lowered their socio-economic 
status significantly, although the rise of the New Malay middle class has meant they 
have to contend with an economically powerful group that is also politically dominant.  
In terms of political representation and citizenship, there is evidence that Chinese 
Malaysians feel like second-class citizens. This is characterised by mistrust in the 
government, as well as inadequate political representation (Sin, 2015; Pietsch & 
Clark, 2014; Tan, 2001). In terms of personal identification, research conducted by 
Sin and Lindstrand with Chinese Malaysian interviewees reveals that they feel a 
sense of national identity with Malaysia, but that their ethnic identity is imposed onto 
them by the state and serves to exclude them from being accepted as a full citizen in 
the way that the Malays and other bumiputeras are (Lindstrand, 2016:38; Sin, 2015). 
The centrality of Muslim-Malay indigenity in Malaysia’s nationalist narrative positions 
the Malays as ‘organically Malaysian’ (Gabriel, 2014:1215), whilst excluding the 
Chinese Malaysians who have limited or ‘constrained’ citizenship (Esman, cited in 
Tan, 2001:958). Therefore, there is both an actual and perceived differentiation of 
citizenship in Malaysia, with the Malays and other bumiputeras enjoying full 
citizenship and access to rights, and the Chinese, Indians and other supposed ‘non-
indigenous’ groups only possessing some of their citizenship rights (Tan, 2012:6). 
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Bersih: the Emergence of a Middle Class Movement 
“Social movements such as Bersih rallies play an important part in engaging 
the Malaysian public in political issues, which in turn has an effect on the 
construction of national identity.”     (Lindstrand, 2016:33). 
 
Bersih, or the ‘Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections’ describes itself as a civil society 
movement which seeks electoral change and good governance in Malaysia. The 
Malay word means ‘clean’, and the organisation is comprised of various non-
governmental organisations (94 according to the latest update on their website), who 
are united in their goals for democratic reform, seeking to improve transparency and 
accountability in politics, eliminate corruption, improve the electoral process and 
allow a free media (http://www.bersih.org/about/8demands/). It was initially 
conceived of as the Joint Action Committee for Electoral Reform in 2005, but was 
officially launched in November 2006 as a coalition of civil society organisations, 
NGOs and opposition political leaders, and issued a communiqé in Parliament that 
demanded electoral change. This culminated in its first rally in November 2007 
ahead of the 2008 elections, where an estimated 30 – 40,000 protesters took to the 
streets in Kuala Lumpar (What you need to know about Malaysia’s Bersih 
movement, 2015), all wearing the distinctive yellow t-shirts that have come to 
symbolise the movement: “the colour for citizen actions and people’s power 
worldwide” (Bersih 2.0, n.d.). After this rally, the official name of the movement was 
changed to Bersih 2.0, and it declared itself a non-partisan movement: not affiliated 
to any political party. 
Since that first rally, there have been four more rallies over the course of nine years: 
the second was the march ‘Walk for Democracy’ in July 2011; the third ‘Sit In’ rally in 
April 2012 ahead of the 2013 general elections; the fourth ‘Bersih 4’ in August 2015 
in response to the billion dollar corruption scandal involving the Prime Minister Najib 
Razak (1MDB); and the fifth ‘Bersih 5’ in November 2016. Many of these rallies were 
characterised by police violence such as the use of tear gas and water cannons to 
disperse the crowds, and citizen arrests, and there has been an increasing 
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authoritarian clamp-down by the government, resulting in increasing difficulties to 
obtain the right to peaceful protest, and the arrest of key people such as the 
chairperson, Maria Chin Abdullah, in the last Bersih 5 protest. 
A unifying characteristic of the Berish protesters seems to be class affiliation, and it 
has been categorised as a largely middle class affair (Yeoh, 2015; Höller-Fam, 
2015). This is seen in the organisation’s use of English in its communication: during 
Bersih 3.0 press statements were first given in English instead of Bahasa Malay 
(Höller-Fam, 2015). In addition, the extensive and effective use of social media by 
Berish and its supporters10 also locates it as a middle class movement. The middle 
class component of the Bersih movement is also highlighted when compared to the 
opposition anti-Bersih red-shirt protest group, which materialised in explicit 
opposition to the Bersih 4.0 rally.11 Unlike Bersih, its members are a much more 
homogenous group made up of the Malay rural class. The red-shirt protesters have 
been dismissed as being Malay chauvinists employed by the UMNO party as part of 
its strategy to maintain power by heightening ethnic divisions (Azlee, 2016; 
Lourdesamy, 2015; Miller, 2017), and the evidence that they are poorer Malays 
serves to highlight the wealth and middle class origins of the Malays who joined 
Bersih.  
The participation of these New Malays, alongside Chinese and Indians Malaysians in 
the Bersih movement, can be seen to be evidence of a burgeoning civic-mindedness 
amongst Malaysians, as not only did they exercise their democratic rights to peaceful 
protest, but Bersih’s demands are for better governance and genuine democracy. 
However, the failure to translate these ideals into a victory for an opposition multi-
ethnic party in recent elections indicates that such middle class solidarity is a limited 
force. Nevertheless, Bersih can be seen as both a manifestation of new middle class 
values and ideals in Malaysian society, as well as the site for such articulations to be 
negotiated.  
  
                                                          
10 For more information on the role social media played in mobilising Bersih participation and activism, 
see Lim, 2016. 
11  The red and yellow colour scheme of protesters marks out which camp they belong to, with red-
shirts being associated with the rural poor, and yellow-shirts worn by the educated middle class. This 
similarly applies to the two protest movements orientated around the Shinawatra family in Thailand 
between 2006-2014. 
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4. Methodology 
 
Research Design 
My research aims to investigate whether the new middle class in Malaysia, 
especially the New Malay middle class, is demonstrating a shift in perceptions of 
identity away from an ethno-centric focus. In particular, I am examining if the 
possibility of class affiliation is transcending previous ethnic affiliations, in line with 
modernisation theory which predicts a shift away from ethnic, tribal and kinship 
attachments towards a more universal, singular sense of identity which prioritises a 
sense of equal citizenship.  
My thesis is an attempt to understand not only the extent of change in Malaysian 
society, but also interpret the reasons for such changes, and any potential 
limitations. Therefore, it employs an interpretivist approach, which acknowledges that 
the results cannot be generalised as it is contingent on subjective viewpoints and 
attitudes, as well as my interpretation of this in the role of researcher. As I am 
interested in the phenomenon of identity categorisation and people’s attitudes 
towards it, I gathered qualitative data based on both primary and secondary data: I 
conducted six semi-structured interviews which forms the original research basis of 
my investigation, and also compared it with three survey results conducted by the 
Merdeka Centre: Public Opinion on Ethnic Relations (2006); Malaysian Political 
Values Survey (2010); and Perceptions Towards Bersih 4 Rally (2015). 
Whilst surveys allow access to a broader sample of data, I chose to use interviews 
as the primary tool of investigation in order to gain more detailed responses. This 
was particularly necessary considering the dense, thorny nature of my research, and 
allowed the space for nuance and clarification. In then combining these interviews 
with data from official survey results, I used a triangulation method of data collection 
to analyse my research questions, which allowed me to gain a fuller, richer and more 
comprehensive account of the processes at work (Cohen et al., 2000). It also 
improves the validity of my research, as I was able to compare information and 
attitudes expressed by my small sample of respondents with earlier attitudes of 
Malaysians as expressed in the surveys. This allowed me to gain a level of both 
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depth and breadth, as I was able to establish how my respondents’ attitudes fit into 
the wider context of Malaysian attitudes.  
Primary Data: Interviews 
Much of the data collected for this thesis was based on telephone interviews with six 
Malaysians conducted between September – December 2017. I conducted semi-
structured interviews, as this allowed some freedom for participants to discuss the 
topics that were most important and relevant for them, whilst ensuring a minimal 
level of consistency in the topics discussed, as well as avoiding tangential 
information. The questions were theme-based as follows: Background and 
Biography; Ethno-Religious groups; Class and NEP; Political Engagement and 
Identity and Belonging.12 Rather than exclusively focusing on class and ethnicity, my 
questions also explored the political situation in Malaysia, as well as perceptions of 
Bersih, as these issues are all inter-connected, and allowed participants to discuss 
the issues in the wider context of identity and politics in Malaysia.  
The interviews were conducted at times suggested by the participants when they 
were at home, and were conducted on the telephone using whatsapp, as this was 
their preferred method of communication. I spent approximately 90-120 minutes 
speaking with each participant, as this allowed me to establish a rapport with the 
participants and check they were comfortable before discussing the questions in 
depth. I needed to follow-up again with three participants to get fuller responses or 
clarification on certain points.  
Sampling 
As I sought to investigate the beliefs and attitudes of the middle class in Malaysia, 
and in particular the New Malays, the participants were selected using purposive 
sampling. This ensured that I was engaging with a representative sample of the 
demographic under investigation. I found the participants via established contacts in 
Malaysia, and all the participants fit the criteria of being middle class Malaysians: 
university educated, white-collar professionals, and except for one, they had all 
travelled or studied abroad. They were aged mostly in their mid-30’s, except for one 
older respondent. They were all male, and either Malay, Chinese Malaysian or 
                                                          
12 See Interview Guide, appendices. 
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mixed-race (Chinese and bumiputera) who were from, or had lived in, urban centres 
in West Malaysia. More detailed information on the participants is presented below. 
The Interviewees 
Below is an overview of the six interviewees, focusing on biographical details.13 
Name 1. Chuck 2. Alan 3. Freddie 
Age 32  56 33 
From KL Selangor, West Malaysia  Melaka; studied in the UK 
Ethnicity Chinese Malay Malay 
Religion n/a Muslim Muslim 
Job Quantity Surveyor for 
Singaporean firm 
Deputy Head and 
Chemistry Secondary 
School Teacher in Sabah 
Contractor in civil 
construction 
Languages English, Malay, Mandarin English, Malay Malay, English, Mandarin 
Extra Has been living in 
Singapore for 7 years 
Born in Singapore, moved 
to Selangor when 12 years 
old 
Has a Chinese wife who 
converted to Islam; their 
children are Malay 
Muslims. 
                                                          
13 See Interview Grid, appendices. 
Name 4. Alex 5. Dan 6. Frank 
Age 36 33 33 
From Sabah, went to school in 
KL and studied and worked 
in the UK  
Born in Sabah, studied, 
lived and worked in Johor 
Bahru since 2005 
Sabah, spent 5 years living 
and studying in West 
Malaysia (Penang and KL) 
and studied in the UK 
Ethnicity Sino -Kadazahn Javanese Sino-Dusun 
Religion  Muslim n/a 
Job Travel Agent, has own 
business 
Associate trainer for off-
shore oil rigs 
Project Manager in own 
construction company 
Languages English, Malay, Mandarin, 
Cantonese 
Malay; English; Bajua; 
Javanese; Mandarin 
Malay, English 
Extra Father is Chinese 
Malaysian, from Johor 
Bahru 
Parents from Indonesia 
(Java) 
Grandfather on father's 
side came from China 
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Secondary Data: Merdeka Center Reports 
My interviews were suppported by research from three survey reports conducted by 
the Merdeka Center for Opinion Research between 2006 - 2015 (available at 
http://www.merdeka.org/pages/02_research.html). This organisation conducts 
telephone surveys with randomly selected Malaysian citizens in order to gauge 
public opinion on pertinent issues, with the aim of supplying policy makers and 
leaders with this information. These reports gathered data from a wide sample of the 
population (1000-3000 participants), all of whom were over the age of 20 years old 
and came from a range of backgrounds and states in Western Malaysia. In all three 
surveys, respondents were found through a stratified sampling method along ethnic, 
gender and age. In two surveys (Perceptions Towards Bersih 4 Rally and Malaysian 
Political Values Survey), a complete respondent profile breakdown is provided, 
which shows that the Malays were the most interviewed ethnic group (over 50%), 
followed by the Chinese. There is an even split between male and female 
respondent participation, and the income ranged from less than 1,500 MR to more 
than 5,000 MR per month. 
 Public Opinion on Ethnic Relations (2006) 
This is the earliest survey, and focuses on establishing attitudes towards and 
perceptions on ethnic relations in Malaysia, as well as gauging future expectations 
on the development of ethnic relations in Malaysia. 
 Malaysian Political Values Survey (2010) 
This survey focused on determining which issues united and divided Malaysians, 
such as the state of the economy, the government, affirmative action, ethnic relations 
and a sense of national unity. Some questions were directed only at Malay and 
bumiputera participants (e.g. affirmative action and national integrity), whilst one 
question was only for non-Malays/non-Muslims (belief in the 1Malaysia programme). 
 Perceptions Towards Bersih 4 Rally (2015) 
This survey focussed exclusively on ascertaining citizens’ perceptions of the fourth 
Bersih rally in 2015. 
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Sources 
I have chosen to restrict my research to English sources only, as despite Malay 
being the official language, English “is the dominant second language and is used for 
a variety of functions in professional and social transactions not only with the 
international community but also within the society” (Lindsay & Tan, 2003:93). 
Furthermore, the developments discussed in this thesis deal with identity-formation 
amongst different ethno-linguistic groups (Malays and Chinese), and English serves 
as a neutral mode of communication for these groups. This is evident by the 
Merdeka Center reports being published in English, and the interviews were also 
conducted in English as this was a language that all participants felt comfortable 
using.  
Other sources used in my research underpin the background and theoretical 
framework (chapters 2 and 3). These rely on government documents such as the 
Population Census (Population Distribution, 2011) and the Malaysian Constitution 
(Malaysia: Federal Constitution, 1957), as well as the historical source: Handbook to 
British Malaya (German, 1935), to locate current events in a wider historical context. 
In addition, as I am examining a contemporary phenomenon, I draw on international 
and local online newspapers and websites such as Malaysiakini, The Sun Daily, New 
Mandala, The Straits Times, The Economist and Asian Correspondent, as well as 
the Bersih website. 
Ethical Considerations 
Due to the potentially sensitive nature of the topics to be discussed, an information 
sheet14 was supplied to the interviewees before participating, which explained the 
goal and nature of my research. In this way, they were given sufficient information 
before deciding whether to participate or not. Only one candidate refused to 
participate after reading this. To ensure consent from them, I also provided a 
consent form,15 which they each read and signed. On this form, the option to remain 
anonymous was given, and whilst some of them chose to waive this right, I decided 
                                                          
14 See appendices. 
15 See appendices. 
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to change all their names to ensure confidentiality. I also made it clear to them that 
they could stop the interview at any time, or refuse to answer a question.  
Research Limitations 
Due to the interpretivist nature of my research, my findings are not applicable to the 
entire population, or even the entire middle class. Only a small sample of people 
were interviewed, and even though this was supplemented with survey data that 
sampled a much larger sector of the population, all the data generated is not 
conclusive. Rather, it gives an insight into the processes, attitudes and beliefs at 
work. 
As my research is focusing on ethnic identity in West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak 
are not addressed, as these semi-autonomous states have a different context. 
However, three interviewees are originally from Sabah, yet they have all spent 
considerable time living, studying or working in West Malaysia, which means they 
have first-hand experience and insight into the nature of relationships and structures 
there. In addition, I have not interviewed any Indian Malaysians, but have rather 
focused on Malays (as the dominant ethnic group in Malaysia) and the Chinese 
Malaysians (as the dominant economic business group), as it is between these two 
groups that historically ethnic tensions and resentment have arisen on the basis of 
economic inequality (Khalid, 2014:7). I acknowledge, however, that the Indian 
demographic is generally neglected in research into Malaysia, and there is a need 
for their voices to be represented more. Similarly, whilst I tried to recruit women to 
interview, none were willing to participate, and therefore all the interviewees are 
male. 
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5. Enduring Ethnic Consciousness 
There seems to be a prevailing ethnic consciousness in Malaysia that has been 
internalised by its citizens, even the more cosmopolitan, well-travelled middle class. 
This has implications both on their perception of their position in society and sense of 
belonging, and also in the way they behave and treat each other. 
The Inviolability of Race 
Malaysians still seem to adhere to racial stereotypes: that Malays are lazy and the 
Chinese are greedy. This is reflected in the survey results of the Ethnic Relations 
Merdeka Center report, where over 50% of Chinese and Malays agreed with these 
stereotypes, even when it applied to their own ethnic group (2006:20). The 
interviewees also articulated these stereotypes, though most of them assigned the 
causes as to the mechanisms of the NEP rather than to any primordial racial 
characteristics: “It has made the Malays complacent because they know they always 
have a portion for themselves, and don't appreciate the opportunity.” (Freddie), and:  
“Malays are quite lazy, even with the bumiputera advantage. They sell their 
licence to the Chinese, so they get money without working. This is really 
common. It’s bad for them, as they are not helping their own race. The reason 
it worries me is that it encourages laziness which is bad for the economy.” 
(Dan) 
One interviewee even described the division of labour between ethnic groups, which 
harks back to the colonial ethnic division of labour: “Most billionaires are Chinese 
Malaysians (from raw materials: sugar, paper industry). Indian billionaires are in 
telecommunications. All the races don't do the same to be rich.” (Freddie) 
Therefore, it can be seen that racial stereotypes that were formed under colonial 
conditions have been maintained, and are reproduced by the NEP which encourages 
the Malays and bumipiteras to be less competitive, thereby producing group 
characteristics based on race. It is striking how the conceptions or ethnicity 
articulated by my interviewees echo colonial constructions of race in British Malaya: 
that the Malays are lazy and the Chinese are greedy, which Holst explains as the 
result of the postcolonial government borrowing and maintaining oversimplified 
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colonial categorisations of race (2012), and the example of racial profiling in 
government textbooks highlighted by Sarah Lian indicates that the state is actively 
involved in disseminating such notions of race. This can be seen as a continued form 
of indigenous colonialism by the postcolonial government (Fanon, 1963). Whilst not 
necessarily being the result of elite machinations to maintain their power, it is evident 
that these markers of identity have been internalised, in line with Alatas’ theory of the 
‘captive mind’ (cited in Rahman, 2009:433), where colonial assumptions and 
knowledge have been absorbed by the postcolonial subject, keeping them trapped in 
rigid colonial structures of control and dominance. 
All the interviewees identified the three main ethnic groups in West Malaysia as: 
Malays, Chinese and Indians. When asked how to identity them, they all indicated 
that it was easy due to physical characteristics, language and cultural aspects such 
as dress and food: “Different cultures such as clothes: the Indians wear saris, the 
Chinese the cheongsam. Also the way they eat: Malays with their hands, the 
Chinese with chopsticks” (Alan). Most emphasised physical appearance as being the 
most prominent marker: “Can differentiate by face first – appearance. That is the 
main thing and easy to recognise from this” (Dan), and “It is obvious by their skin 
colour, by their look. This is the most obvious way to notice….[also] food, they eat 
different traditional food. The way you dress up, Malay Muslims women wear a hijab” 
(Freddie).  
They all felt these markers of difference were tangible and identifiable, though Frank 
acknowledged the ambiguity of these markers of identity: “If they are mixed it's 
harder to know. For example a Chinese-Indian baby (Chindian) looks a lot like a 
Malay so it's hard to tell” (Frank). Freddie, having insisted that religion can be 
changed but ethnicity cannot, went on to describe how his mother, an ethnic 
Chinese, has a Malay identity: 
“My Dad is a Malay, my mum is ethnically Chinese but was adopted by a 
Malay family at birth….My mum was registered as a Malay, but she looks 
totally Chinese. But her language, culture, that’s all Malay…she has Chinese 
blood but all the rest are Malay.”  
In addition, his wife is Chinese, but his children are categorised as Malays, despite 
being of mixed Malay and Chinese descent, as is the case for Frank’s sister’s 
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children. Frank and Alex point out how Indonesians and Filipinos are offered 
citizenship and a Malay identity: “Our deputy PM is originally from Indonesia and can 
even still speak Javanese, but he is identified as a Malay” (Frank), and: “In Sabah, 
Filipinos were given citizenship and a Malay identity to bolster the Malay vote…it’s 
the same with Indonesians” (Alex). This shows the fluidity of racial categorisations, 
and in particular the expansion of the dominant Malay-Muslim identity.16 
Despite evidence of the arbitrariness of these ethnic categorisations, overall all 
interviewees seemed to conceive of ethnicity as tangible and inviolable, rather than 
as constructed and fluid: they are attached to a primordial concept of race, even 
when observing situations where supposedly rigid markers of ethnicity have been 
shown to be flexible or arbitrary amongst peers or family members. They refuse to 
adopt a situationalist concept of identity which would account for this flexibility, 
thereby also rejecting the notion that identity is constructed and shaped by external 
factors. Instead, they tend to be committed to an idea of ethnicity as a fixed and 
quantifiable entity. Scott points out that so long as ethnicity is conceived of and felt in 
these terms, then it will continue to have a significant impact on social relations and 
society (cited in Chee, 2010:6). Making a comparison with Anderson’s notion of a 
nation being an imagined community: just because race and ethnic categorisations 
are imagined, does not mean they do not exist or have a tangible impact on society: 
being constructed and arbitrary does not make them inconsequential. Therefore, 
instead of nullifying the effects of ethnicity in Malaysian society, such primordial 
perceptions reify and preserve ethnicity as a significant marker of identity.  
Ethnic Segregation 
Malaysians tend to socialise and mix only in formal environments, and otherwise 
remain ethnically segregated. All interviewees stated that different ethnic groups only 
tend to mix in formal or professional contexts: “…At work they are forced to mix and 
work together, but socially they can choose and they tend to stick to their own.” 
(Chuck); “They only meet in formal environments, and after go back home to practice 
their own culture.” (Alan); and “During working time they mix together with no 
problem. But the social part - having a tea, coffee, it is rare” (Dan). Interestingly, 
three participants indicated that there used to be more social mixing between ethnic 
                                                          
16 For more details on this process, see Afzal, 2017. 
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groups in the 1960s and 1970s: “In my school days, everyone mingled and there 
was no polarisation. During festivals everyone celebrated and paid a visit to each 
other's homes” (Alan), and:  
“My father said back in the 1970s, people mixed more and race relations 
were better. All races could sit at the same table, but now that's really rare to 
see. The Chinese and Malays would only do that if it were for business, not as 
friends.” (Frank) 
This observation was also noted in research conducted by Tan (2012:9). 
Therefore, there seems to have been a shift since the 1970s towards more 
segregated ethnically-orientated socialising, and it is interesting to note that 
interviewees indicated that this shift occurred after the introduction of the NEP, which 
implies it has had a divisive impact on ethnic relations. 
Ethnic Suspiciousness 
The NEP and the dominance of Islam have contributed to enduring mistrust between 
citizens based on their ethnicity. This is confirmed by the interviewees: “Different 
races and religions are more suspicious of each other” (Alan), and: “people identify 
as an ethnic group. This identity is based on friction and competition between 
races….the Malays dominant over other groups and there is suspicion between 
groups” (Freddie). Freddie goes on to explain how, as a Malay, he has felt 
discriminated against by the Chinese when doing business: “They give a better price 
to their own race…the Chinese when speak to each other, they give a special 
treatment. It’s not really open or fair for other people”.  Frank too, describes how his 
business partner, who is from Papua but speaks Mandarin, got a cheaper quote from 
a Chinese shop compared to Frank who asked for a quote in English and Bahasa 
Malay, showing ethnic affiliation over and above a sense of neutral citizenship.  
Much of this suspicion seems to be based on perceived economic inequality, with 
the Chinese generally perceived as the richest ethnic group and the Malays (and 
other bumiputeras) as the poorest. Only Alex claimed that the Chinese were the 
poorest group, positioning them alongside the bumiputeras in contrast to the Malays, 
whom he saw as the wealthiest. All interviewees acknowledged that the rich Malays 
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had earned their money illegally through government connections, and is an 
example of a failing of the NEP.  
Ethnic suspiciousness was also evident by the analysis of Bersih via the framework 
of ethnicity, where the dominant participation of Chinese Malaysians was debated 
and discussed in the media, especially after the Bersih 4 and 5 rallies (Wong, 2015). 
This observation is supported by my interviewees, who qualify that there were fewer 
Malays and a majority of Chinese: “It was also mostly Chinese due to the urban 
setting….but there were also some Malays” (Alan), and Alex specifies that the 
Malays who did join were the New Malays: “It was not really Malays who joined, 
generally Chinese and Indians. And 10% of Modern Malays, who are younger or the 
professionals. Between 20-40 years old”. This is also supported by the  Perceptions 
towards  Bersih 4.0 report, where a ‘favourable’ perception towards Bersih was 
highest amongst the Chinese surveyed (81% compared to only 23% of Malays) 
(2015: 5), though journalists report that the last Bersih 5 rally showed greater ethnic 
diversity (Hew, 2016).  
The accusations of Bersih as a mostly Chinese movement is significant, in that it 
insists on ethnicity as a frame of reference for the movement. Several analyses of 
the Bersih rallies focused on assessing their ethnic composition and in particular 
strove to determine whether a substantial number of Malays participated, or if it was 
dominated by Chinese Malaysians (Hew, 2016; Wong, 2015). If it were mostly a 
Chinese movement, it would indicate that the push for change was coming from a 
non-indigenous group, thereby invalidating its aims and de-legitimising the 
movement. What is relevant here is not whether the rallies were attended by a 
majority of Chinese Malaysians or not, but rather, how the discourse in the media still 
focused on ethnicity, illustrating how it remains a powerful and legitimising force in 
Malaysia, even in a movement that sought to dismiss ethnic orientation. 
The interviewees also express concern about the dominant influence of Islam and 
the Malays, which is causing divisions, even those who were Muslims themselves: 
“Muslim people have negative thinking, and this is a critical problem for Malaysia. 
They want to universalise the rules and norms they follow” (Freddie), and:  
“If a female non-Muslim marries a Muslim, she has to convert, and her 
children would be Malay. This is not fair, as they are not given a choice. As it 
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is now, the Malays never have to give up anything and the onus is always on 
the other to convert” (Frank). 
Therefore, there remains strong suspicion between ethnic groups, based on 
perceived economic benefits and the predominance of Islam, which gives preference 
to the majority Malay group. This colours discussions even in supposedly neutral 
organisations such as Bersih, that attempt to move beyond ethnicity.  
My research confirms the potency of authority-enforced structures such as the 
political system and the NEP on ethnic identity. They breed suspicion and 
competition between different ethnic groups, as they compel Malaysians to submit to 
ethnic identification and grouping, thereby ensuring ethnicity remains a key marker of 
identity. The political structuring along ethnic lines is evident in the Barisan Nasional 
government, which promotes itself as a coalition amongst the three main ethnic 
groups whereby each party serves the interests of their ethnic group, and seeks 
support and votes from an ethnically defined base. Many scholars (Holst, 2012:84; 
Rahman, 2009:429) have argued that this is a deliberate move to maintain power: 
“politicians play the race card because their survival is dependent on ensuring their 
power base…[and therefore] the division of races remains intact” (Khoo, cited in Lee, 
2017). Others argue that it is a logical, fairly successful way to govern a plural 
society, which manages to preserve the identity and interests of each ethnic and 
cultural group (Hwang and Sadiq, 2010:193; Tan, 2001:953). Whilst it may not be the 
case that it is a deliberate ‘divide and rule’ strategy to maintain power, the persistent 
reduction to ethnicity in Malaysian politics means that there cannot be a shift away 
from ethnic concerns and identification.  
In addition, the benefits derived for the bumiputeras from the NEP ensure that 
citizens are embedded in ethnically differentiated levels of citizenship, with different 
access to rights (Pietsch and Clark, 2016:309). The practices of the NEP and the 
Malaysian state were deemed to be racist and discriminatory at a structural level in a 
2013 report by the Human Rights Foundation Malaysia (Bowling, 2013:1) which 
posits that the channelling of funds, permits and licenses to one race for the purpose 
of economic development is discriminatory. However, Young argues that affirmative 
action is sometimes necessary to ensure equality, as not all citizens are positioned 
equally in society (1989). This can be seen to be the case with the Malays and 
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bumiputeras after independence, as they tended to occupy an economically lower 
position than the Chinese due to the colonial division of labour. Therefore, it can be 
seen that differentiated citizenship and the bestowing of certain rights to a 
disadvantaged group can contribute towards ensuring a fairer, more equal society. 
Yet in the case of Malaysia, as Lindstrand points out, it is questionable whether the 
Malays can be considered a disadvantaged group, as they are the majority 
population whose interests are most catered to by the government through the 
dominance of UMNO, and they have an undisputed claim to indigenity, with essential 
features of their identity such as religion and language safeguarded in the 
constitution (2016:37).  
Considering the structural conditions of equality in Malaysia are ethnically defined, 
and that citizens are compelled to submit to ethnic identification to access rights and 
participate politically, it is unsurprising that my findings show how citizens are 
embedded in such notions of race and ethnicity, both conceptually and in their daily 
lived realities. 
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6. Transcending Ethnicity 
There is evidence that many Malaysian middle class members recognise their 
confinement within an ethnic grid of identification and citizenship, and are seeking to 
move beyond this. This is manifested in expressions of a new sense of unity and 
middle class solidarity, as well as calls for political and economic change. 
Belonging as Unity 
The Bersih movement seems to have unleashed a palpable sense of unity amongst 
members of the Malaysian middle class, and this feeling can be viewed as a sense 
of belonging. Many of the interviewees stressed the tangible sense of unity felt by 
the participants in the Bersih movement: “All people were united and tried to create a 
sense of unity from all sides” (Dan), and: “Many of my friends put on yellow on their 
Facebook wall…there was no separation in this kind of thing…all were united” 
(Freddie). This was also reported by journalists who were present at the rallies: 
“Two days ahead of Merdeka day (independence day) this Bersih rally was 
awash with Malaysian flags and people singing the national 
anthem.” (Hoffstaedter, August 2015). 
This sense of unity and belonging seemed to transcend ethnic divisions, as many 
news reports and journals observed that the ethnic make up of participants in all the 
Bersih protests included Malays, Chinese as well as Indians: “…its support cuts 
across the country’s diverse ethnic, racial and religious demographics” (Smeltzer 
and Pare, 2015:121), and:  
“Another important feature of the Bersih movement has been its multi-
ethnicity, which has gone in the face of efforts in the past three years of racial 
politics, as Malaysians have shown solidarity across communities” (Welsh, 
2011:2). 
The interviewers also acknowledged the multi-ethnic make up of Bersih protesters, 
where Malaysians of all ethnicities came together. It provided an alternative space 
outside of the formal work environment to mix in: “…it had people from different 
categories. Different professions, age, the middle class mostly….the ethnicity I saw 
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was balanced….Bersih has different varieties” (Freddie), and: “The first Bersih you 
could see there was a variety of people. Chinese and Malays and Indians” (Frank). 
The interviewees expressed a desire for further mixing between ethnic groups: “We 
need to mix more if we want to be the same nation, share culture and mingle. We 
need to be like one village” (Alan), and this is specified as being a key feature of the 
New Malays: “These new Malays are vocal and don’t care about these divisions, 
they come as united….Modern Malays think we are one” (Alex). This is supported by 
the results of the Ethnic Relations survey, which shows most Malaysians are 
optimistic about mixing more in the future and consider it beneficial (2006:11-12). 
The main reasons given why this is considered a positive trend is to ensure peace 
and avoid conflict (2006:13), and this has implications on how Malaysians conceive 
of a national identity, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In the previous chapter, the interviewees all described the limited scope to mingle 
and socialise across ethnic groups outside of a formal context. The Bersih 
movement provided a new space for the middle class to assemble and operate 
outside of a professional work environment. The sociable aspect of popular protest is 
pertinent here, as my findings indicate that the various groups do not normally 
socialise or mix informally. It allowed various ethnic groups to occupy the same 
social space in their leisure time, which is not the typical way they interact, and 
indicates the scope for realising more mixing. Bersih rallies were described as 
having a festive atmosphere (Holmes, 2015), with music, food and drink, alongside 
the more typical ritualistic aspects to protests movements such as flag waving, 
chanting and singing: 
“The mood among those gathered was festive, with drums and vuvuzelas 
heard along with speeches, songs and chants by participants calling for a 
"clean Malaysia" and "people power". (Thousands march in ‘Bersih’ protests, 
2016). 
The sense of solidarity evident in a social movement such as Bersih can be 
explained by a Durkheimian notion of ‘collective effervescence’, whereby the 
collective gathering of people in a physical space, united in a shared, specific focus, 
allows them to share an intense, unifying collective experience (Durkheim, 1912). 
Therefore, in practising their civic rights to protest, the Malaysian middle class is also 
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engaging in a ritualistic exercise of solidarity that transcends ethnic divisions, as the 
perceived common enemy is the government rather than members of another ethnic 
group. This collective consciousness and dedication to the nation can also be seen 
to comply with modernisation theory, as Anderson describes the nation state as 
having replaced religion in being able to summon devotion and loyalty from its 
subjects (2004).  
Dissolve Ethnic Labels 
As well as desiring to mix more between ethnic groups, some interviewees 
conceived of transcending ethnicity as involving the dissolution of ethnic categories 
of identification entirely: “We need to do away with ethnic categories…when it should 
just be Malaysians” (Alan), and: “Most things involve races, we always have to label 
our race when we fill in forms or register for absolutely anything. It's all about 
labelling your race. Maybe we should put these labels aside and so they cease to be 
important” (Freddie). 
A suggestion of how this could be achieved was via marriage, as indicated by 
Freddie, who has an inter-ethnic marriage, and Frank:  
 “There was a funny article that suggested forcing people to only marry people 
from another race, and forbid someone from marrying their own race. In this 
way, there would be no more Indian, no more Chinese, no more Malays - 
these categories would dissolve. It would be nice.” (Frank) 
My findings seem to confirm that members of the middle class in Malaysia, including 
the new Malay middle class, are keen to embody a universal national identity and 
discard ethnically-orientated demarcations. Although some scholars have observed 
that the specific nature of citizenship in Malaysia is still bound by allegiances to 
family and clans which override those with the state (Kessler, 2001:42), my research 
offers a glimpse of a more universal, undifferentiated conception of citizenship. This 
fits generally with modernisation theory, which claims the formation of a stable 
middle class will push for greater civic rights and democratic processes. The 
extension of modernisation theory by Parson, which focuses on the breakdown of 
previous organising structures of identification, such as tribal loyalty, is also 
evidenced by my research. This is observed as occurring in Malaysia by 
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Saravanamuttu, who claims that the middle class and civil society groups are 
increasingly engaged in “universalistic concerns and issues…that goes well beyond 
ethnic and communal issues” (2001:116), as middle class Malaysians seem to 
identify increasingly less with their ethnic kinship groups, and instead feel a kinship 
that transcends ethnicity, uniting them in a sense of shared citizenship.  
Transcendence as State-led 
The interviewees tended to argue for state-led, top-down changes, especially 
abolishing race-based parties and the NEP, as a way of ridding Malaysian society 
from its ethnic obsession: 
“The political landscape has to change to achieve real harmony and get rid of 
race based segregation. There would have to be no race based parties; it 
would have to be possible for an Indian or Chinese to be PM” (Frank). 
The increased support of a multi-ethnic opposition party indicates that Malaysians 
are willing to abandon racially aligned political allegiances for a multi-ethnic party. 
Support for an opposition party, including a multi-ethnic one, has been building over 
the past decade (Brown, 2005; Lian & Appudari, 2011; Maznah, 2005; Moten, 2009; 
Noor, 2013). The interviewees echoed the desire for political change, and the 
potential support for a multi-ethnic opposition by the middle class: “In the city, 
perhaps, people would vote for the opposition regardless of their race” (Chuck), and: 
“Modern Malays, Chinese and Indians want regime change” (Alex). 
Some interviewees also advocate terminating the NEP, which assigns rights and 
benefits according to ethnicity: 
It’s total bullshit. It reduces everything down to if you are a Malay or not. The 
other races see it and feel it, as loans and subsidies are all for Malays and 
Muslims.…[but] the Modern Malays are willing to forgo their privileges, even 
though they are Malays” (Alex). 
 Whilst some interviewees feel the NEP and its affirmative action was necessary at 
the beginning, most felt it should be ended, as it is unfair or has now become 
obsolete: “Bumiputeras no longer need 100% support and many can stand in their 
own. Most Malays (the educated ones) feel it is obsolete and unsustainable” (Alan). 
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Here, the New Malays are cited as being potential agents of change in abolishing a 
policy that allocates rights based on ethnicity. Some interviewee have benefitted 
personally from the NEP, and yet still feel it is an unfair policy, demonstrating the 
perception of the New Malays and other middle class bumiputeras. Other 
interviewees who also enjoy bumiputera rights felt it was still necessary to ensure the 
economic success of the Malays and bumiputeras (though they acknowledge it has 
been mismanaged). It is significant that these members of the Malay and bumiputera 
middle class, having gained their status from such discriminatory policies such as the 
NEP and through the political system, and who continue to benefit from these 
structures, are advocating scrapping them. This indicates the adoption of a 
universalistic ideology of equal citizenship that transcends communal organisation, 
as middle class allegiance provides a sense of solidarity amongst citizens that 
seems to transcend ethnic divisions. 
However, the abolishment of race-based parties or the NEP does not seem to be 
advocated by the majority of bumiputeras and Malays. The Ethnic Relations report 
shows there is very little support (4-5%) for abolishing race-based parties (2006:45), 
and this attitude is recognised by the interviewees, even if it is not their personal 
view. They cite ingrained racial divisions and a lack of unity by the opposition parties 
as a reason for the maintenance of the status quo: “But the government is still 
supported by the majority Malays” (Alex), and: “The opposition might come together 
for the election, but it is too weak and the government will stay. The racial divisions 
are too strong and people are not united” (Dan). 
Enduring support for the Barisan Nasional government and its policies is deemed to 
come from the less educated, rural Malay group, which is embodied by the counter 
red-shirt protests. The interviewees echo this assessment: “Red-shirts were funded 
by politicians, not volunteers. They are young and jobless, blinded by their leaders. 
All pure Malay, unlike Bersih which has different varieties” (Freddie), and: ”The red-
shirts opposition were monkeys hired by the government. They were only one race - 
all Malays, driven by "Malaysia for Malays" ideology. They don't care much about the 
economy, only about race and Malay supremacy” (Dan). In addition, the Political 
Values survey shows that most bumiputeras are unwilling to forgo their privileges 
(2010:12, 20), whilst the Ethnic Relations report shows that whilst the vast majority of 
Chinese expect for all cultures and religions to be given equal rights in the future, 
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this contrasts with only 38% of Malays (2006:38), indicating that the majority of 
Malays do not want to give up their economic or status privileges. Therefore, despite 
the leanings of the Chinese and Malay middle class to advocate support for a multi-
ethnic political party and the termination of the NEP, there is still a majority of 
support for maintaining the status quo in Malaysia. 
My interviewees’ articulations of how transcending ethnic categories can be 
achieved show an absence of consideration for making micro-level, bottom-up 
changes, which would involve adapting individual actions or habits to foster more 
cross-ethnic solidarity, such as socialising together. Instead, nearly all their 
articulations of transcending an ethnically orientated identity focused on changing 
the structural conditions, which is the remit of the government. This explains the 
support for a group such as Bersih, which has a very clear, precise mandate for the 
legal changes they want to be made, as specified by their ‘8 demands’ (Bersih 2.0, 
n.d.). The potency of such structural conditions on values, perceptions and attitudes 
cannot be underestimated, as socialisation into “ an ethnic identity…cannot be 
understood apart from the political processed in which government actions and the 
ideologies fostered by the state play a role” (Tan, 2000:441). Therefore merely 
advocating making top-down, structural changes is an understandable and legitimate 
response. 
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7. Articulating Malaysian-ness: The Paradox of the Middle Class 
An idealised sense of Malaysian identity posits unity, harmony and peace amongst 
cultural pluralism: “a bubbling, bustling melting-pot of races and religions where 
Malays, Indians, Chinese and many other ethnic groups live together in peace and 
harmony” (About Malaysia, n.d.), as well as a striving for development as envisioned 
in the nation-building programmes. Four interviewees claimed to identity with a 
Malaysian national identity (the other two identified with Sabah rather than Malaysia, 
as they were raised there), and described this in terms similar to the official state 
narrative: “Malaysians know how to get along and respect other cultures and 
different races” (Dan), and:  
“To be Malaysian is to feel like you are one country, one nation, to feel 
progressive and to strive to be world class. To be proud to live in one country 
with different ethnic groups, and this unity in diversity makes Malaysia unique 
as they have remained peaceful” (Alan).  
This is supported by the Ethnic Relations report, where 90% of respondents were 
proud to be Malaysian, and of those 54% gave the main reason for this as peace, 
stability and having multicultural national unity (2006:31), with only 6% resenting 
having to be tolerant of a multi-ethnic society (2006:37). The report also specified 
that educated and higher earning respondents tend to identify as Malaysian rather 
than with their ethnic group (2006:8).  
However, Alex notes that the national conception of Malaysia-ness as described by 
the interviewees is not the reality, but rather the result of state-fed ideology: 
“Malaysian identity is...where there is no friction between religions and races, and 
focus on progress and the future. At least that’s what school teaches us, but the 
reality is different as there is competition between the races and rampant corruption”. 
This cynicism towards the ideal of a national identity is evident in the interviewees’ 
attitudes towards such nation-building programmes as Vision 2020 and 1Malaysia, 
which seem to be met with hostility and suspicion, as despite their aim to unite 
citizens, it is perceived to create divisions: “It’s a white elephant. It does not really 
unite people, just pays lip service to this and actually it is used to siphon off money to 
enrich certain groups. It divides the three groups more.” (Chuck), and: 
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“It is a political gimmick, used to satisfy people and say nice things. It’s only lip 
service: marketing but there is no substance. Some patriotic people might 
think it works, and the government is trying to appease these minorities.” 
(Alex) 
Three interviewees express consent with the intention and concept of the 
programmes, but feel they fail due to poor implementation: 
“There is a good intention, but I’m not sure about the results. It is a good 
concept and the beginning of bringing people together. It's a baby step…” 
(Frank) 
“It’s a sound philosophy and well-intentioned, but the implementation is not 
good so we don't see a difference. So Malaysians support the concept and 
idea of the programme, but lose faith in it when they see how poorly it is 
implemented.” (Alan) 
Therefore, there is shared ambivalence and even cynicism directed at such nation-
building programmes as Vision 2020 and 1Malaysia, though the ideology 
encapsulated by such ideologies are generally approved of. 
In transcending ethnicity, the interviewees offered a definition of a national identity 
which chimed with the official, state sanctioned ideal as offered by such nation-
building programmes as the Vision 2020 and 1Malaysia programmes, which all 
emphasise unity amongst diversity. Indeed, their formulations of an ideal national 
identity were remarkably similar, and are aligned with the image Malaysia presents 
of itself internationally. This is explained by Alex as due to it being transmitted 
through school education, and Anderson emphasises the significance and success 
education has on forming national identity (2004). Therefore my research indicates 
that the articulation of a national identity is limited to the official state narrative, which 
is part of authority-imposed identity rather than drawn from everyday lived reality, 
and there is a paradox in that citizens seem to adopt such a national ideology from a 
state they highly distrust. Furthermore, the rhetoric of equality in these nation-
building programmes seem incoherent in a system that utilises the NEP to prefer a 
dominant ethnic group (Kessler, 2001; Tan, 2001). When viewed in light of the ethnic 
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divisions and fault-lines in Malaysia, the national, universal ideal of citizenship 
appears untenable and superficial. 
The possible reasons for this are due to the formulation of national identity based on 
peace and development, as well as the conditions of the formation of the Malay 
middle class. In offering up their definitions of an ideal national identity, all the 
interviewees asserted a sense of unity and harmony amongst diversity. The common 
motivation for adhering to this formulation of national identity was the need to 
maintain peace and stability, and to avoid violence. This tenet of peace and harmony 
is woven into the very definition of what it is to be Malaysian, and along with the 
memory and trauma of the 1969 race riots, which serve as a ‘continual ethnopolitical 
narrative’ in Malaysia (Sin, 2015:536), act as a deterrent for any sort of forceful, 
potentially violent protest in advocating change. This is understandable when 
viewing the violence and bloodshed that have erupted in neighbouring countries 
such as Indonesia, which has also had to manage huge ethnic diversity in 
formulating a united national identity. After the 1997 financial crisis, which saw a flare 
up of ethnic violence directed at Chinese Indonesians, Crouch cites the lack of ethnic 
violence in Malaysia as an indication of the success of its ethnic and political 
organisational structures (2001:225). Indeed, in the 1950s the advent of Malaysian 
independence was met with some scepticism as to whether it was possible to 
manage such ethnic diversity peaceably (Cheah, 2002:xvi), and Malaysians might 
rightly feel relieved and proud that they have not succumbed to similar violence, and 
therefore cling to their relative history of peace and stability as an essential, 
sacrosanct part of their national identity. 
This seems to contradict modernisation theory, as it indicates that Malaysians are 
unwilling to push for change in a revolutionary way, unlike Eurocentric models of 
development towards democracy where the middle class “shattered and blasted 
away the shackles of feudal society” and created a new socio-economic order 
(Kessler, 2001:38). The Malaysian middle class does not exhibit the same 
uncompromising revolutionary fervour, and this is due to cultural and contingent 
factors (Embong, 2001:15). The creation of a middle class in Malaysia, unlike the 
emergence of the middle class in Europe, “did not emerge from any locally 
autonomous process of internal social development” (Kessler, 2001:39). Rather, it 
was a state-sponsored project that was considered vital for the success of nation- 
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building. The New Malays, in particular, were nurtured by the state through the NEP, 
and owe their existence to the structural conditions of the UMNO dominant BN 
government. Therefore, for them to oppose or challenge the state is problematic, and 
Yao and Kessler both assert that it makes this class ‘infantile’ and ‘docile’ as it was 
born out of political servility, rather than in opposition to the political status quo (Yao, 
cited in Chong, 2005a; Kessler, 2001), and this might explain the lack of sustained, 
dramatic resistance. Rather, my research implies that the middle class seeks to bring 
about change only through the existing political and social framework, rather than 
opposing or trying to dismantle it, and this is evidenced by the expectation of top-
down state-led changes by my participants.  
Another common thread in the articulation of national identity, both from the 
Malaysian state and echoed by my interviewees, is the emphasis on development 
and economic progress. Freddie cites a comfortable quality of life as an essential 
ingredient of being Malaysian: “Malaysians are happy go lucky. Not so competitive or 
stressed out. You can have a good, decent, simple life and everyone is committed to 
make the country better”. This was viewed as an essential strand of being 
Malaysian, and scholars have argued that it is this striving for continual economic 
growth that is the motivating factor for members of the Southeast Asian middle class 
to come together in protest against the government (Berenschot et al., 2016:20; 
Case, 2002; Thompson, 2007). The key objective of the Bersih movement is to 
eradicate corruption in the electoral process, and the last Bersih 5 rally was 
specifically aimed at voicing discontent at Prime Minster’s Najib Razik involvement in 
a multi-billion dollar corruption scandal (1MDB scandal). Therefore, it can be viewed 
that the middle class was united and mobilised against corruption and bad 
governance:  
“They are focusing their political engagement more on problems of corruption 
and governance, and less on strengthening the rule of law or the 
advancement of citizen rights.” (Berenschot et al., 2016:20).  
The motivation for this is because it threatened the economic conditions for their 
future growth and progress, rather than due to any commitment to the ideals of 
democracy and citizenship (Thompson, 2007:3). Case argues that there is little 
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evidence that the Malaysian middle class has any real desire for democracy or the 
restructuring of society to bring about more equality (2002; 2013). 
This seems to undermine modernisation theory: 
“…modernization theory is stumped, with recession, rather than steady 
growth, fueling new middle-class interest in a more competitive party system. 
Further, with economic recovery, this interest in accountability dissipates 
rapidly, revealing it to have progressed little beyond a longing for boom 
times.” (Case, 2002:125).  
Rather, both the Malay and Chinese Malaysian business and middle class “valorizes 
economic progress” (Hwang and Sadiq, 2010:210), and therefore any action calling 
for democracy is based on the frustration of this capitalist class seeking more access 
to the global marketplace in their desire to ensure continued prosperity. Indeed, the 
fall of Suharto’s New Order and subsequent transition to democracy in neighbouring 
Indonesia was prompted by the 1997 economic crisis, where citizens grew frustrated 
when promises of development were no longer being met. Therefore, it seems the 
middle class is motivated to fight for change only when their lifestyles and social 
mobility is threatened, and whilst they are benefitting from the system, they do not 
seek to change it. 
The contingent nature of the Malaysian middle class could once again explain their 
lukewarm drive for democracy and equal citizenship. The Malaysian middle class 
can be viewed as a capitalist class (Chong, 2005b:575), not only located in the 
global capitalist system, but also formed by such processes. They are therefore 
inherently bound to and aligned with capitalist processes, which explains their main 
concern being stability and economic growth. As Embong states, they seek political 
and societal change, yet also seek comfort and safety, and the New Malays in 
particular are “security and consumption-oriented, and appreciative of …[the 
state’s]…benefits” (2001:20). Therefore, their drive for radical change from both 
middle class bumiputeras and Chinese Malaysians is limited, and they are caught 
paradoxically between dependence on and opposition to the state. The national 
narrative prioritises stability and economic development as key tenets of being 
Malaysian. However, in upholding this, citizens’ efforts to realise another tenet of the 
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national identity: that of an equal and harmonious sense of citizenship, are 
hampered. 
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8. Conclusion  
I have sought to investigate the factors that have kept Malaysian citizens’ sense of 
identity grounded in ethnicity, and the potential for a reimagining of identity that 
moves beyond ethnicity towards a universal, national sense of citizenship. In 
focusing on the opinions and perceptions of members of the middle class, who can 
be considered a cosmopolitan, broadminded and influential sector of Malaysian 
society that is often at the forefront for pushing for change, I hoped to gain an insight 
into how far this ethnic consciousness is being transcended, and explore the viability 
of an alternative, national sense of belonging. However, I am aware that my research 
is drawn from a small sample, and therefore no firm generalisations can be made. 
Nevertheless, I hope it has provided a glimpse of the processes at work, and allowed 
me to infer the potential for change, which I will do in this chapter. 
My research has shown that members of this class of citizens carry deeply ingrained 
racialised perceptions which they identify with, and this ‘reinforces boundaries 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ that crosscut citizenship, nationality and ethnicity’ 
(Sin,2015:546). This is unsurprising considering how ethnicity permeates and 
determines all facets of life. Colonial categories of race are maintained and 
continually reproduced by the postcolonial state, and the NEP in particular, is 
evidence of structural inequality where access to rights is ethnically defined and 
based on perceptions of indigenity. This results in differentiated citizenship that 
breeds suspicion and competition between ethnic groups. My interviewees did 
express a desire to move beyond such ethnic consciousness, but they were unable 
to articulate how this could be achieved, beyond looking to the state to dismantle the 
structures that produce them. Having been nurtured by the postcolonial state, groups 
within the middle class are reluctant to defy it, and are accustomed to adapting to 
and working within its framework, regardless of how displeased or disillusioned they 
are with it. This undermines modernisation theory, which assumes the middle class 
will forcefully push for change with little regard for their own comfort or security, as 
was evident in many European contexts. The specific capitalist conditions that 
produced the middle class in Malaysia, especially the New Malays, restrains them 
from forceful action. Additionally, in relating to a conception of national identity which 
prioritises peace and stability, they are further constrained. 
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However, what might be occurring is a slower, gradual transition towards a more 
equitable imagining of society and citizenship (Ufen, 2009; Subramanian, 2011). The 
fact that Sarah Lian used her platform as a celebrity to voice her disagreement with 
the state’s formulation and imposition of identity, as well as the participation of 
citizens in the Bersih rallies, indicates that the desire for change is present and 
underlying. I feel it is unlikely that such leanings will retreat or disappear, though the 
momentum to achieve them may fluctuate. The mechanism for realising this might 
be slow and follow a more restrained, evolutionary path, achieving change in the 
space within the existing political system rather than through revolution.  
A potential obstacle for achieving change, however, is a possible emerging class 
division. Historically, it has been observed that the middle class tends not to enter 
into coalitions with the lower classes (Case, 2013:15; Fanon, 1963), and this is seen 
in my research where the desires and opinions of the red-shirts are dismissed as 
being ignorant and unfounded. The Malaysian journalist Tricia Yeoh even claims that 
the middle class is best authorised to determine what is best for society, including 
what is best for the lower classes. She claims that in seeking a fairer, non-
discriminatory society that does not grant rights based on ethnicity, the middle class 
is also advocating what is best for the lower classes (Yeoh, 2015). However, this 
seems presumptuous and unqualified. The New Malays have benefited from and 
been nurtured by the NEP, and having now secured themselves economically, they 
can afford to advocate abolishing these rights on the grounds that it is discriminatory 
and racist, assured that there security and status will be maintained.  This is not the 
case for the rural Malays, who remain statistically the poorest group in Malaysia 
(despite receiving benefits from the NEP), and who therefore feel hugely attached to 
state benefits (Rahman, 2009:429).  This locates future potential fault-lines for 
tension not on ethnicity, but rather on class and perceived economic need. However, 
it also has the potential to move the dialogue towards pro-poor policies that are not 
ethnically weighted, but rather, are based on a class or needs-based criteria. 
It remains to be seen what direction Malaysia will take in its transition towards a 
national sense of identity. I feel that the state’s articulation of national identity is not a 
particularly workable conception as it is riddled with paradoxes, and this suggests 
that perhaps the onus lies on its citizens to imagine and negotiate a more coherent 
ideology. In addition, the state’s attempts at realising its conception of a Malaysian 
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identity seem to be limited to its nation-building programmes, which citizens seem to 
simultaneously identify with, and yet are also cynical about. Chomsky describes this 
sort of duality as exemplifying “Orwell’s problem”, which is: 
“the ability of totalitarian systems to instill beliefs that are firmly held and widely 
accepted although they are completely without foundation and often plainly at 
variance with obvious facts about the world around us.” (1986:xxvii)  
Chomsky suggests that the solution to dismantling such structures - a way to 
transcend the paradox, lies in discovering and understanding the factors that create 
and sustain them. This thesis is an attempt to do that.  
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9. Appendices 
 
 Participation Information Sheet 
26-08-2017 
Title of Research Project: Identity in West Malaysia   
Researcher: Sheza Afzal, Master’s student of Leiden University 
___________________________________________________________________ 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether to 
participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and 
what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
You are welcome to discuss this project with others if you wish before you make your 
decision. Please ask me if you would like more information (sheza.afzal@gmail.com 
/ +31 615177383). 
___________________________________________________________________ 
What is the purpose of the study? 
To understand the experiences of West Malaysians’ sense of identity and citizenship 
based on ethnicity, religion, culture and economic situation. This is in relation to the 
Malaysian state’s vision of development and national harmony, represented by 
ongoing national development projects such as the National Economic Policies 
(NEPs), Vision 2020 and 1Malaysia. This research combines interviews with 6-8 
Malaysians with literature from news sources and existing academic research. 
Do I have to take part? 
No, you don’t. It is your choice whether or not to take part.  
What will happen if I take part? 
You will be asked to participate in one interview over the telephone in English. You 
will be asked several questions.  Some of them will be about your personal 
experiences of school, family and  
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work. Others will be about your opinion on policies and the future of Malaysia. 
How much time will it take? 
The interview will take approximately 1 hour. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
This is a chance for you to share your experience of being a Malaysian citizen at a 
critical point in Malaysia’s development, and to discuss any changes you observe in 
the way the society is organised (ethnically, religiously, economically). 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
No risks are foreseen. 
Will the information be confidential? 
All your responses to the interview questions will be kept strictly confidential. Your 
identity will not be published or revealed, unless you give permission for this.   
Can I withdraw from the research? 
Yes, you can withdraw. Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you can stop 
at any time, or skip questions you do not want to answer.   
What should I do if I want to participate? 
Let the researcher (Sheza Afzal) know that you are willing to participate. Then, a 
suitable time will be arranged for the telephone interview, and you will sign a consent 
form beforehand (attached). 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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 Interview Consent Form 
Title of Research Project: Identity in West Malaysia 
Researcher: Sheza Afzal, Master’s student of Leiden University 
 sheza.afzal@gmail.com / +31 615177383 
Research Participant: ……………………………………………………….. 
Please tick the appropriate boxes  Yes  No 
Taking Part   
I have read and understood the participant information sheet dated 
26/08/2017. 
  
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project.   
I agree to take part in the project. Taking part in the project will include 
being interviewed and recorded (audio). 
  
I understand that my taking part is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study 
at any time and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want 
to take part. 
  
Use of the information I provide for this project only   
I understand my personal details such as phone number and email address 
will not be given to people outside the project. 
  
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web 
pages, and other research outputs. 
  
Please choose one of the following two options:   
I would like my real name used in the above   
I would not like my real name to be used in the above (anonymous).   
Use of the information I provide beyond this project   
I understand that other academic researchers will have access to this data 
only if they agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as 
requested in this form.. 
  
I understand that other genuine researchers may use my words in 
publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs, only if they 
agree to preserve the confidentiality of the information as requested in this 
form. 
  
So we can use the information you provide legally   
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to this project 
to Sheza Afzal. 
  
 
 
Name of participant………………………………………….Signature …………………….Date ……… 
Researcher ……..…Sheza Afzal………………….…….  Signature ……………………. Date …… 
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 Interview Guide 
Interview Guide 
 
Thank you for taking the time to talk with me. This chat will last about 40 minutes/1 
hour. I’m going to ask you some questions about yourself first, then about topics of 
race, religion, class, economics and politics in West Malaysia, which I would like your 
opinion on. But you can skip any questions you don't want to answer and you can 
stop the interview at any time. Do you understand? 
 
Do you have any questions so far? 
 
Ok, good. So let’s start. 
 
 
1. Background and biography 
 
 What is your full name? 
 How old are you? 
 Where did you grow up? 
 Do you come from a big family? Do you have siblings? 
 What do your parents work with? 
 What type of school did you go to? Did you like it? Why/ why not? 
 Did you attend university? Where? What course? 
 What kind of work do you do? 
 Where do you live now? 
 
 
2. Ethno-Religious Groups in West Malaysia 
 
 What are the different ethnic groups in West Malaysia? 
 How are they different?  
 (If religion not already mentioned) What about the different religions? 
 Does each ethnic group also have a particular religion? 
 Do these groups mix much? 
 Do you think this is overall a positive thing? 
 Do you think it overall works to make a harmonious society? 
 Do you think there have been, or will be, any changes to the way these 
groups are interact? 
 Does that worry you? 
 What is more important in Malaysia: race or religion? 
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3. Class and NEP 
 Since independence, do you think Malaysia’s economy has been developing 
well? 
 Do you think all the groups in Malaysian society are equal economically? 
 Who are the rich citizens in Malaysia? 
 Who are the poorest citizens? 
 Do you think Malaysia has different classes (people with different economic 
levels)?  
 Who are the ‘New Malays’?  
 What do you think of the NEP policies? 
 Has it been successful so far? 
 Do you think Malaysia should keep the NEP in the future? For how long? 
 
 
4. Political Engagement 
 If talking about politics, what is an important issue for you? 
 Has this always been an important issue for you? 
 Are there any recent issues concerning politics that have in particular caught 
your attention? 
 Are politics in Malaysia the same as always or have there been changes? 
 Is Malaysia a democracy? 
 What do you think of the Bersih movement? 
 Which kinds of people do you think joined it? 
 Do you think the people who joined were from the same ethnic group? 
 Do you think the people who joined were from the same class? 
 Do you think it has been successful? 
 Do you think it could be successful in the future? 
 What about the anti-Berish movement (red-shirts?) 
 Why did they disagree? 
 Do you think the Berish movement changed anything in Malaysian society or 
politics? 
 
 
4. Identity and belonging 
 Do you feel Malaysian? 
 What is it to be a Malaysian? 
 Do you think other Malaysians accept or see you as a Malaysian? 
 What do you think of the Bangsa Malaysia and 1 Malaysia government 
programmes? 
 Do you think they help people feel more national harmony? 
 Are they necessary to feel united in Malaysia? 
 
Interview Grid: Summary of Interview Notes
1.       Cheong Man Jin 2.       Mr Ashmir Bin Raul 3.       Ismail Effendy Bin Ahmad Nordin Endy 4.       Alvin Quek Chawkee 5.       Dwi Endi 6. Franky Lim
Background
• Age
• Grew up
• Parents from
• Ethnicity
• Religion
• Job
• 32 years old
• born and grew up in KL, now living in Singapore (7 yrs)
• Mother: KL   Father: Perak state
• Ethnicity: Chinese
• Religion: officially Buddhist, but identifies as Taoist
• Job: Quantity Surveyor for Singaporean local firm
• 56 years old
• Born in Singapore, moved to Selangor, Malaysia when 12 yrs old
• Mother: Singaporean   Father: From Selangor
• Ethnicity: Malay
• Religion: Muslim
• Job: Deputy Head and Chemistry Secondary School Teacher in Sabah (since 
1986)
• 33 years old
• Born and grew up in Melaka (Penang and UK for Studies)
• Parents and grandparents from Melaka. Dad is a Malay, mum is ethnically 
Chinese by adopted by a Malay family at birth. Her mother died in childbirth and 
then when her grandfather couldn't look after her he gave her to his best friend 
who was a Malay. She was brought up as Malay and registered as Malay, despite 
being ethnically Chinese.
• Ethnicity: Malay
• Religion: Muslim
• Job: Contractor in Civil Construction, small-scale entrepreneur
Has a Chinese wife who converted to Islam, and their kids are Malay and Muslim.
• 36 years old
• Born and grew up in Sabah/ Umpang, KL school, lived in Penang for 7 yrs; 
studied and worked in the UK (Thomas Cook)
• Father: Johor Baru (Chinese), moved to Sabah at 18    Mother: Sabah 
(Kadazahn)
• Ethnicity: Chinese -Kadazahn mix
• Religion: Roman Catholic
• Job: Travel Agent, own business, small-scale entrepreneur. 
• 33 years old
• Born and grew up in Sabah till 18, then moved to Johor Baru
• Parents from Indonesia (Java), work as hawkers in night market (bbq chicken)
• Ethnicity: Javanese
• Religion: Muslim
• Job: Associate trainer for off-shore oil rigs
• 33 years old
• Born and grew up in Sabah, spent 5 years living and studying in West Malaysia 
(Penang and KL)
• Parents from Sabah (Dusun), grandfather on father's side came from China. 
Father is a businessman originally in construction, now in food products
• Ethnicity: Sino-Dusun
• Religion: n/a (Christian)
• Job:  Project Manager in own construction company
Language English,  Mandarin, Malay Malay; English  Mandarin, English, Malay English, Malay, Mandarin, Hakka, Kadazan, Cantonese  Malay; English; Bajua; Javanese; Chinese Malay, English
School Experience
KL government school, majority Chinese (due to location), Malays, 
Indians, some East Malaysians. Malay medium. Spoke Mandarin to 
other Chinese students, and Malay to Malays and Indians. Language 
changed depending on who speaking to.
English medium government school (last batch to be educated in English). All 
Malaysians at school, of different ethnic background. Urban so Chinese 
majority, and Indians. Some Malays. All spoke English (only Bahasa and Islamic 
studies taught in Malay). Each group spoke own langue within groups and 
English between groups. Language: better if government had stuck to English as 
it is the international language, whilst Malay is just for Malaysia. Would have 
been like Brunei or Singapore and progressed. Too many politicians interfering 
in education rather than educationists. Politicians believe Malay language is 
very important, and yet they send their children overseas. They misunderstand 
patriotism as it is not about languages, but about progressing the country. 
Bahasa is important only in Malaysia, locally, but globally English is more 
important. This change has lowered education standards and meant Malaysia 
has fallen behind (compared to Singapore).  Now the government recognises 
this and is trying to redress this with dual language programmes. Step in the 
right direction, but not sufficient. Importance of Civic studies (how to be a good 
citizen).
Local, government school (all boys) 7-12 yrs old. Malay-medium. Multi-racial, but 
Indian minority. Spole Malay with friends, and English to others or those raised 
speaking English. 
Sabah government Anglican school, dominant Malay (60%), Chinese (20%), 
mixed bumiputras (15%) and Indians. Umpang area of KL, was mostly Chinese 
and spoke Cantonese so blended in well. Non-Cantonese speakers were 
Mandarin speakers or other dialects - was harder to blend in. Malay minority in 
college, but out of college, the Malays were dominant  and visible majority 
group. English language medium. In school, don't explicitly learn about the racial 
hierarchy, but it is understood and everyone knows their place. Due to the 
attitude of the leaders. 
Chinese primary school (as close by): 1. Chinese majority, 2. mixed, 3. Dusun, 4. 
Muslims (Malays, Baju) and government secondary school (mixed): 1. Muslims 
(Malays), 2. Mixed, 3. minorities like myself (Javanese, Indian) but never felt 
like a minority as Sabah is very mixed. In JB, there are Chinese and Indian 
school, but few. It is positive that people can choose which school based on 
race/language.
National (Malay medium) primary and secondary school. Most students were 
bumiputeras, with many of mixed parentage, and also mixed local with Chinese. 
Only 10% were Chinese and no Indians. All students spoke Malay, and with their 
own ethnic group they might also speak their own language. Went to TAR 
college - an initiative set up by the MCA Chinese political parties to help poor 
Chinese-ethnic students obtain cheap/free university education, as they were 
restricted by the  government quotas for national universities, and private 
universities and overseas education was too expensive. College funded by MCA 
and private investment. Doesn't think the Indians have an equivalent system. 
Also spent 3 months studying in the UK in Sheffield.
Opinions on Ethnicity (West 
Malaysia)
3 main ethnic groups - of course different. Languages, physical 
appearance, culture and way of living.
3 main races. Have different religions, cultures, festivals, schooling and come 
from different villages. Culture: clothes, Indians wear saris and Chinese the 
choengsam, Malays the headscarf. Also the way they eat: Malays use their 
hands, the Chinese use chopsticks. These are little, petty things but they mark 
out differences. Malays are suspicious of the Chinese, who are suspicious of the 
Indians due to competition. Overrides competition. Race more important than 
religion has everyone has the right to practice their religion. Need to do away 
with ethnic categories. Malaysians pay much more attention to this, identify 
with ethnicity over religion, when it should just be Malaysians.
3 main ethnic groups: Malay, Chinese, Indian, and some foreigners. Diversity 
within categories, even Malay race has branches, and Chinese. (e.g. Melaka - 
Portuguese heritage, Bangow, Shin, Baba-Nonya). Different: skin colour, by their 
look. Most obvious way to observe difference. But for me, we are all Malaysians. 
Also different way of doing business, or culture maybe. e.g. different traditional 
food, dress (hijab for Malay Muslim women).
West Malaysia: 1. Malays (majority), 2. Chinese, 3. Indians. If you don't involve 
politics, and think of just Malaysian, then people identify as an ethnic group. This 
identity is based on friction and competition between races. Before people felt 
more united (1990's KL, all celebrated Independence Day), but now in 2017 the 
Malays dominant over other groups and there is suspicion between groups. Due 
to poorer economy. Bumiputra also has classes/hierarchy: 1. Born Malay 2. 
Malay convert (West Malaysians) 3. Malay convert (from indigenous bumiputra 
East Malaysia) . For Chinese who convert, it depends on their skin colour if 
accepted as class two or three (rather than West or East)???? as some blend in 
more due to physical appearance. Doesn't know if the government instils these 
differences, or if it is just the mind-set of the people.
Ethnic group: JB: majority is Malay, 2nd is Chinese, 3rd Indian (big group of 
Indians in JB). Remaining are outsiders: Kelantan, Sabahhans. Now in JB living 
in a city, so it is very mixed as well. No feeling of minority. Can differentiate by 
face first (appearance). This is the main thing and easy to recognise from this. 
When the current government is losing it plays the race card (Malays for 
Malays) which upsets the Chinese and Indians. When politics gets to that stage 
it will worry me. But not before that point.
Main groups: Chinese, Malays and Indians, with some different groups such as 
Baba Nonya and 'Jakun' indigenous native people. But they are a minority. Can 
tell the differences by the ay they talk mostly, the slang they use and their 
accent when speaking Malay or English. But also by their face. If they are mixed 
it's harder to know. For example a Chinse-Indian bab y(Ch-indian) looks a lot like 
a Malay so it's hard to tell. In this context the parents and child would speak 
English rather than Malay, so that would be one way of knowing. LANG: Urban 
Malaysians speak better English than rural Malaysians, and generally the Indian 
and Chinese population speak better English than the Malays. It is considered 
important for getting a good job. In Sabah, thinks there has been a shift in ethnic 
categorisations and they no longer accept mixed ethnicity, so the options for 
babies to be registered are: Chinese / Dusun (or other ethnic group) / Malay. No 
Sino-Dusun choice like he had.
Opinions on Religion
Religion separates people more than race                 Malays = Islam (no 
choice, given at birth) impression of religiosity and strict followers of  
religion;            Indians  = Hindu, Christian, not so religious, can choose    
Chinese = Christian, Buddhist, Taoist.
Malays = all Muslims. Constitution deems this. Chinese = Buddhist, Christian. 
Indians = Hindus mainly, some Christian converts.
Religion - majority Muslims. There are Chinese and Indian Muslims in Melaka. 
Also Buddhists and Hindus. Very few atheists. More important than race, as very 
sensitive topic. Majority are Muslims, who are very sensitive about everything. 
They are not really open and give bad impression or the religion, and this reflects 
badly on the race. Muslim people have negative thinking, and this is a critical 
problem for Malaysia. They want to universalise the rules and norms they follow 
(e.g. banning October fest in case Muslims attend: you cannot  force other races 
to follow what you re prohibited from. You should mind your own business and it 
is not fair).
Each race identifies with its own religion. Malays are worried about Malay - 
'putwah en Melayu = pride to be a Malay'. 'Born a Malay, die a Malay'. Malay = 
Muslim, and they can't legally change their religion. Some Malays are worried 
that there people might want to change to other religion (Christian, Hindu, 
Pagan) in village. In Sabah, Philippines were given citizenship and a Malay 
ethnicity to bolster the Malay vote. Buying votes for legal status and ID. Same 
with Indonesians (but don't cause trouble like the Filipinos). Race and Religion 
equally important.
Religion: Muslims are the biggest in number, 2nd are Chinese and 3rd is Hindu. 
Chinese: Buddha, the one with the temples. Malays focus increasingly on 
religion, Indians focus on both race and religion, and for the Chinese I'm not 
sure. Every shop has its own shrine so it might be religion. Now we have a new 
society of non-believers who don't care about religion. There are only a few 
and from every race. But on the ID card it still states a religion, and Muslims 
have their own courts, laws, Sharia.
The majority are Muslims, then Christian, Buddhist and Hindus (if you consider 
that a religion). But for the Abrahamic religions it is Islam and Christianity. The 
Muslims are mostly Malays, and if you are a Malay you are a Muslim for sure as 
there is no choice in this. It's like the Jewish identity, it is both a race and religion 
and you are born into it. Race and Religion are the same thing. It doesn't apply 
for other ethnic groups. The government of Malaysia claims there is freedom of 
religion and that religions can be practised freely, but you can't covert if you are 
a Muslim. You can't leave Islam, whilst you can for the other religions. There was 
one example of a Malay who tried to convert to Christianity (Lina Joy) when she 
married a Brit. It was highly controversial and there was a media frenzy. I think 
she left the country in the end.
Groups mix?
Depends on region, but at work they are forced to mix and work 
together, but socially they can choose and tend to stick to own. 
Language plays a role as need to be able to speak each other's 
language to mix more. There is a barrier, but not necessarily a negative 
thing, as situation still ok and people communicate quite well. 
Harmonious and peaceful.
In school days, everyone mingled and there was no polarisation. No different 
background. During festivals everyone celebrated and paid a visit to each 
other's homes (Hari Raya, Chinese New Year)???? Indians too? Less mixing now 
due to politics which polarises. Different races and suspicious of each other and 
less open-minded. Mingle less and kept apart. Only meet in formal 
environments, and after go back home to practice their own culture. 
Yes, overall. Language:  felt discrimated by Chinese when they speak their own 
language in order to give each other special treatment/better price. This is not 
transparent or fair, as cannot understand what they are saying. Is excluded. 
Language separates people who can't be in an equal situation with someone of a 
different language.
Do mix overall, generally united for the sake of progress, but small % of 
hooligans feel responsible for the fate of the Muslim religion. The Chinese 
therefore do not seek a very visible profile, and tend to take care of themselves 
rather than look for government support. Indians too, look after themselves.  
Muslim/Malay = power, money and politics.  Overall harmonious, but will 
change.  Malays have a certain ideology - want to be clean, covered. e.g. Laundry 
only for Malays (so Chinese and Indians excluded). Experience in the UK - didn't 
feel judged by race/religion or name. Didn't depend on any of these things but 
on performance. Felt good.
They mix at some point, during working time they mix together with no 
problem. But the social part - having a tea, coffee it is rare. Even I don't have 
any Indian friends. For football though, everyone comes together. But socially, 
they prefer to hang out with their own race. I sometimes see Chinese and 
Indians together, but in those cases the Indian can speak Chinese (as probably 
went to a majority Chinese school), but the Chinese never speaks Indian. If 
people don't mix much it is not healthy. A multi-national culture is a good 
thing, and now the social element is missing. Until now it worries us 
sometimes, but not unduly. It is a small issue, and down to small 
misunderstandings. When some Chinese and Indians bring the peace down by 
not respecting the Muslims and then the Muslims fight back. Maybe they don't 
get the real understanding of the Muslim religion. Based on what is 
represented by the media. So far there haven't been any riots. Language: often 
Chinese and Indians prefer to use English rather than Malays, and even some 
Malays are teaching their children English over Malay, so we are losing the 
national language due to English language hegemony.
The groups don't really mix. In his college it was mostly Chinses with a Malay 
minority, so the Malays did mix with the Chinese and have Chinese friends as 
they were forced to, but if there had been more Malays I'm not sure there would 
have been as much mixing. It is difficult though, as when you go out to eat you 
have to consider the other culture (e.g. Muslims can only eat halal food). They 
have a different culture. Of course it is possible to be friends but it is not 
common. The cultural differences keep people apart, and the government too 
divides us. The 3 political parties are race-based (UMNO = Malays, MCA = 
Chinese, MIC = Indians). Doubtful another country in the world has this system. 
The ruling party made up of these three groups plays the race card every time 
there is an election and appeals to voters based on ethnicity. Uses the threat of 
the 'other 'to control people -e.g.  if you don't vote for us the Chinese will get 
more seats.  Learnt this from the British - divide and rule. It is easier for them to 
control the population this way. Also education keeps people apart too, as each 
race has its own school. Why not have a single stream school? The Chinese 
prefer to send their kids to a Chinese medium school if possible, and they get 
better results too. Why not take the best bits of all the schools and combine 
them into one? A minister suggested this in 2016 but it was shot down. The 
Chinese were resistant to the idea mostly, as they have been promised their 
own education system since the 1960's. However, people do mix and feel united 
when watching sport.
Future: mix more? Yes, surely. And this is a good thing (couldn't explain why).
Need to mix more if want to be the same nation, share cultures and mingle. 
Need to be like one village, and urbanisation is good as forced to live together.  
Will change in the future due to urbanisation and growing population. Villages 
will become fewer and everyone will live together.
Getting more mixed. Has Chinese wife. Now government schools are not 
segregated along ethnic lines (private schools are). Good for general society as 
need to work together, as segregating and differences causes discrimination.
These new Malays are vocal and don't care about these divisions, come as 
united. Modern Malays think we are one. Willing to forgo privileges for Malays, 
even though they are Malays.
Hopefully yes. Older people do respect each other's religions, but the 
youngsters don't. They want to prove they are right and the other is wrong. 
People mix less when it comes to politics.
Will mix more in the future due to the internet and the world changing it is not 
as easy to control the population and what they think. Now everyone can have 
their opinion and this helps people mix. Father said back in the 1970's people 
mixed more and race relations were better. All races could sit at the same table, 
but now that's really rare to see. The Chinese and Malays would only do that if it 
were for business, not as friends. Would be nice to go back to that. 
Comments on Economy
Developing but not doing as well in recent years (compared with 
Thailand, Indonesia) Malaysia is already behind, due to 
mismanagement of funds and unstable political situation.
Overall since independence has made good progress and reduced poverty 
among the rural population Now urban poverty. 
During Mahathir's time the economy did really well. Leaped forward and was 
competitive in SEA. Set great example to other SEA countries. The economy was 
good then, but Malaysia is dependent on other bigger countries, and world 
problems affect Malaysia's economy too. 
Economy has gotten worse, prices of oil and food has gone up and living 
standards have decreased. Property prices also gone up. 
Economy is going well overall. People have 2 cars, 1 motorcycle for one 
household. There are lots of job opportunities, and the economy is picking up 
again. 
No difference to normal I feel. Most Malaysians complain because the current 
government implements GST, most of my friends said it's not right to impose tax 
on the poor but I think it's ok to have this as most other countries do. We have 
many investors coming in now, though mostly from China and not Western 
countries anymore.
Views on NEP
Only benefitted Malay elite, and didn't help poorer Malays who are still 
poor, so hasn't really worked. Nonsensical that 1 policy can last for so 
long, and government needs to review from time to time (it has 
though!) Sensitive issue and politicians use it to harness support from 
poor Malays, and Malays still dominant group (60%) so will not be 
dismantled anytime soon. No dramatic change with this policy, for at 
least 5-10 years.
Overall successful as reduced poverty, but created a gap between haves and 
have nots. The rich got richer and poor got poorer. Not managed to reduce this 
gap due to the way it has been implemented, as benefits business people only. 
Doesn't benefit rural people. Vision 2020 replaced NEP, and there is also TN50 = 
national transformation by 2050. All these new policies are about development.  
NEP is no longer relevant, many parts of it are no longer relevant and have been 
done away with e.g. university quotas for Malays, now it is down to 
meritocracy. Bumiputera's no longer need 100% support and many can stand on 
their own. Most Malays (educated ones) feel it is obsolete and unsustainable. 
Need to focus on education and cultivate self-reliance.
I don't know what the situation is right now, what phase it is in. I've hard about it 
in the news, in school. It involves mostly building more schools, public places. The 
founding principle was the only way to help our race (Malay). Even though we 
are the majority, not all are opportunists or hard workers. There is hard, tough 
competition from other races. Overall this policy is both good and bad. It has 
made the Malays complacent because they know they always have a portion for 
themselves, and don't appreciate the opportunity. Mostly my race misuses it, as 
Chinese want to own a licence or get a contract, and uses a Malay proxy to get it. 
But it is needed to maintain a balance in the economy.  This policy in the future 
depends on how the leaders manage it. (top down change).
Total bullshit. Reduces everything down to if you are Malay or not. The other 
races see it and feel it, as loans and subsidies all for Malays and Muslims. 
Chicken feet and wings left for the other races. Malays were weak at that time 
and needed help, so Mahathir introduced NEP. But never made sense to have 
this. Malays were the smallest business minority, but the majority group. Whilst 
Chinese and Indians were excelling, they were just lazing around and getting 
spoon-fed, whilst Chinese and Indians have to graft. Malays need to be 
proactive, not complacent. It should be stopped, but will be a challenge and if 
Modern Malays take over, it is conceivable. Personally made use of bumuputra 
status to get 5% discount, but felt injustice of this - what about for my Chinese or 
Indian friends? How is this fair?
Not so aware of what the NEP is. Unsure if we still have this, or in what form. 
Not healthy policy to try to bring majority of Malays to conquer the economy, 
as Chinese still dominate, so the policy has failed. Malays are quite lazy, even 
with the bumiputera advantage. They sell their licence to the Chinese, so they 
get money without working. This is really common. Bad for them, as not 
helping own race. The reason it worries me is that it encourages laziness which 
is bad for the economy, which will suffer in the future. NEP has been misused 
most of the time, abused by their own people.  We should keep it, as we need 
to keep a balance and otherwise the Chinese will takeover and it will be like 
Singapore, so we still need it. If it weren't for the NEP, even though Malaysia is 
majority of Malays, it would have become like Singapore. Need to give 
advantage to local people to keep it Malaysian.
Used to be against the NEP as believed there had to be a meritocracy, and it 
shouldn't be based on ethnicity. That is racism and discrimination.  Aspired to a 
system more like Singapore based on merit. But no, feels it was selfish to think 
like this (as a partial Chinese Malaysian). Feels the rights of the bumiputeras do 
need to be protected as they are still very backward, and if the government 
didn't help them then they would really be suffering. There needs to be 
restrictions for what the Chinese and other non-bumiputra groups can buy or 
own, for land for example, as otherwise they would own everything. After 
independence the Chinese and Indians were the wealthiest and best educated 
groups, and were therefore best positioned to guarantee their social mobility at 
the expense of the Malays and other bumiputeras. So the NEP has been 
necessary to safeguard the rights of Malays. Hopes eventually won't need it, but 
not sure how long it will take. It was supposed to be abolished after 30 years but 
was extended as hadn't achieved enough. Why not? Due to poor 
implementation and corruption, and the allowance of Ali-Baba alliances. The 
problem is not with the idea of the NEP but with the implementation, as people 
will always use it to benefit themselves even if they disagree with it in principal. 
They will still use it.
Rich / Poor Malaysians
Disparity getting worse. Rich Malaysians= good government 
connections. Mostly Chinese (more than 50% of richest Malaysians are 
Chinese) who are business-orientated, but now some Malays are very 
rich due to good government contracts. Some will be rich illegally so 
will not appear on any rich list. Corruption. Poor Malaysians = 
Politicians claim it is Malays, who clearly haven't benefitted by NEP. 
Poorly educated, manipulated by leaders.
 The richest Malaysians are the Chinese, Malay and even Indian billionaires. Not 
really ethnically defined, though if we count by numbers, Chinese are the 
dominantly more. People who live in urban poverty are the poor. All races.
There are Chinese/Malay and Indian billionaires, so they are equal economically. 
Quite balanced overall if talking about the richest Malaysians, but most 
billionaires are Chinese Malaysians (from raw materials: sugar, paper industry). 
Indian billionaires are in telecommunications. All the races don't do the same to 
be rich. Division of labour - colonial trend. Poorest citizens are also represented 
across the races, as each race has its poor people, and each race has their society 
that helps these kinds. So poor Malays, Chinese and Indians are mostly the same. 
Richest = Malay Muslims. Poorest = Chinese and native people, others, Indians. 
10 richest Malaysians are often Chinese businessmen (e.g. sugarcane king), and 
Indian from telecommunications. Rich on paper, but Malays are richer due to 
corruption and illegal wealth.
Richest = Chinese, then second are Malays and some Indians. Even in 
workplace the top management is always Chinese. Poorest are Malays.
There is economic inequality in Malaysia and it is race based. The Malays are 
very far behind the Chinese and Indians. The richest citizens are Chinese, as you 
can see all the businesses are owned or run by Chinese. The poorest are the 
Malays and some Indians. There are one or two very rich Malays who are well 
connected to the government. This shows how the NEP has failed due to 
corruption. It's the government's responsibility rather than the people's. 
Rural / Urban divide
Urban areas = mix more easily and without problem
Suburban/rural areas = some problems as don't mix and kept apart. 
Stay within their group as not forced to mix through work.
Villages are organised along racial lines. The Chinese live in urban areas, whilst 
Malays and Indians come from their own villages so seldom see other races. 
They only meet in schools and offices. This will change with urbanisation. But 
now there is urban poverty which affects all ethnic groups. Worse than absolute 
poverty. Reduced rural poverty which affected people  in the 1970's  all races, 
but mostly Malays as they stayed in their villages and didn't tend to move to 
cities as much.  
I really like the village people who can live in harmony.  In rural villages they are 
more mixed and united e.g. Chinese can speak Malay fluently. In cities there is a 
lot of separation between the races. People go back to their own race kind of 
mentality. The Muslims are more conservative, so there is less community. 
Separated by communities. 
The rural folks speak English less well than the city folk. 
New Malays Young and doing well 
Melaya Bauru: More educated, open-minded, not orthodox, have a global world 
view are young, and are economically stable, often entrepreneurs. It is a 
political term, and only used in the past 10 years. Open to change and seek it.
I don't know who they are! I heard term 'Melaya Bahru'from our PM. They 
created this term, and I wonder what their mission is in doing so. They say they 
are the young, urban, educated Malays, but that mentality is behind. There are 
Malays who live in villages or the jungle, but who have thinking more mature 
(beyond) in terms of racial thinking.
Modern Malays "young, professionals and well educated. 20-40 years old. Old 
Malays stick to roots and ideology, modern Malays have evolved, which is crucial 
for progress and growth. These new Malays are vocal and don't care about these 
divisions, come as united. Modern Malays think we are one. Willing to forgo 
privileges for Malays, even though they are Malays????? INTERVIEW THIS 
FRIEND? Same class - middle class.
I don't know. Haven't heard about them.
The New Malays are the more progressive and liberal ones, but can't be that 
liberal as they wouldn't accept Malay marriage, or the removal of Islam as the 
official religion, or the idea that their son or daughter could convert to 
Christianity. So in reality are not that liberal. There is also an increased focus on 
new political parties which are supposedly not  race based . However, in reality 
they tend to still attract a dominant ethnic majority, so TAP mostly has Chinese, 
and Party A mostly has Malays. In contrast, Sabah and Sarawak have never had 
race based parties.
Political Topics
Upcoming election. Would like to see a 2-party system so that there 
are checks and balances. At the moment the government has no 
competition and runs unchecked. Vote for opposition party regardless. 
Others might not vote against their ethnic lines, as often perhaps they 
have a sense of solidarity with that candidate, see something common.
Politics and misguided sense of nationalism has hindered Malaysia's progress 
(language policy). Politics dictates everything and has caused polarisation. 
Education is the most important tool to unite the nation, and make people mix. 
Being taught the same syllabus, textbooks, sharing the same space, doing the 
same exams.
When asked about class, responded with: There are only 2 classes: politicians and 
non-politicians. People who contribute more to the government get more 
business as get government projects. At least 70% people are chatting about the 
upcoming election (before June 2018). 
Discuss hot topic: can a Chinese or Indian ever become PM? Not now, but maybe 
in 20+ years. Optimistic about change due to New Malays.
Some people feel apathetical, condemn all sides (government and opposition) 
over the past 2-3 years as the ruling party is still the ruling party. Most city 
people hate them, but the opposition isn't united and have their own conflict, 
fractured into 3 parts. DAP = play on Chinese sentiments, intent to bring 
economy up and create another Singapore. Don't care about the Sultan or 
religion. PAS = main weapon is Islam and they want to create an Islamic 
country like Saudi. PKR = just want to win and motivated by revenge for 
Anwar's imprisonment. No clear policies. This fracture and conflict benefits the 
ruling party.
Politics - Sabahan autonomy is key issue. Do not want national political parties 
(recently UMNO), as don't want to be stepson of West Malaysia. Malaysia is a 
democracy of sorts, a 'guided 'democracy, as the races, population and media is 
all controlled and corruption is rampant and getting worse and allows UMNO to 
keep power. For example, it grants Filipino immigrants who are Muslim or 
convert to Islam citizenship in return for the guarantee that they vote for UMNO, 
thereby ensuring they win. In this way it is still a democracy as still have 
elections.
Last election(s): 2013, 2008
2013 protests showed people are looking for change, but the voting pattern 
didn't essentially change. They talk about change, and urban voters did vote for 
change but rural stick to the status quo. Rigged? Maybe, but no proof. 
Doesn't believe the opposition party/parties would mean any big changes in the 
way Malaysia is run. The system would still be the same and just the actors are 
different. There would still be corruption. Angry that Mahathir has now joined 
the opposition as this has discredited it, and showed it to be opportunistic and 
about gaining power rather than standing for any principles, anti-corruption or 
wanting to change and better Malaysia. 
Opinion on Bersih
Not really neutral NGO but supported opposition (Anwar's party: PKR). 
Almost synonymous for this.
Good that it wasn't a revolution and protest is allowed in a democracy and was 
useful to show government people's discontent. Claims neutrality but of course 
is aligned with opposition party. Handicapped somewhat as to protest you need 
a permit and to follow procedures, which is difficult to obtain (but not for red-
shirts).
Got a lot of media attention but didn't result in regime change. Bound by law and 
can't take down government. But had symbolic success as made the discontent 
and cause known, drew attention to it and that's good. 
Big fan of Bersih and what it stands for. Clean electoral system. Vital to have fair 
elections to move forward and progress. Look at history - Philippines to get rid of 
Marcos, walkabout. Inspired by this. When will it be our turn? Will join when 
that happens and join protests in KL.
It's a good thing as long as they don't overdo it. Puts pressure on the 
government so keeps them on their toes and shows that people are stronger 
than the government. But like a child asking for attention. It doesn't involve 
any government parties, it is not neutral, the only agenda it has it to condemn 
the government. A bit effective, but government still controls the media.
Was a good thing but now I know it is not neutral, but a proxy for the opposition 
parties. It had an agenda and the chairperson, Ambiga, awas closely aligned with 
the opposition. This was disheartening and changed opinion of the movement 
and organisation. They are not genuine and they will benefit if the opposition 
wins. Overall still a good thing though, as it did manage to bring Malaysian 
together under one banner, and all united in opposition to the government. 
Who joined & why?
Didn't personally join as was in Singapore. People who wanted a 
change in government joined. PKR opposition party brought people 
from all ethnic groups and class together for the 1st time in the history 
of Malaysia! As well as East Malaysians. Even poor Malays supported 
him.
Main common feature was all were educated. Mostly Chinese due to urban 
setting but also some Malays (relatives joined in KL). Wanted to voice out 
dissatisfaction through peaceful demonstration. Red shirts: anti-Bersih. Mostly 
youth from government parties and mostly Malays (UMNO youth party). 
Many of his friends put yellow on FB wall and actively supported and went into 
the streets during the elections. They would be prepared to do so again. People 
from different categories : professions, age, ethnicities, middle class mostly. All 
were united, no separation, and in other cities too (London, Hong Kong). All had 
same mission. Red shirts = funded by politicians, not volunteers. Young and 
jobless, blinded by their leaders. All pure Malay, unlike Bersih which has different 
varieties.
Not really Malays who joined, generally Chinese and Indians. And 10% of 
'Modern Malays'.
Mainly Chinese and Indians, those that feel they don't get enough attention, 
desperate people. From various ethnicities, from everyone. All people were 
united and tried to create a sense of unity from all sides. This was achieved 
during the moment of the rally but after each went back to their own agenda. 
From mixed economic background (rich and poor). They came together for 
political purposes rather than business. Small, low-income people supported 
Bersih too as they feel like the government is cruel and unjust. Angry about 
price hikes. Red-shirts opposition: monkeys hired by the government. Only 1 
race - all Malays, driven by "Malaysia for Malays" ideology. Don't care much 
about the economy, only about race and Malay supremacy. Gangsters who are 
brainwashed and follow their politicians, like the KKK. Paid by big people.
The 1st Bersih you could see there was a variety of people. Chinese and Malays 
and Indians. But the last one there was a small turnout and this is due to PAS no 
longer being part of it, so it lost a lot of support. Now it was mostly Chinese and 
Indians rather than Malays. This shows that it wasn't really from the people but 
rather about the political parties. Not a people's movement. Opposition red 
shirts were members of UMNO, all Malays and probably paid.
Future prospects of Bersih?
Initial motivation and support has dropped as government remained in 
power. People are disillusioned and apathetic, and now Bersih is 
finished as there is no strong opposition. Not convinced by it.
Useful as despite not bringing change in government, it allowed people to voice 
their discontent, and make government aware of this which is enough. Now we 
need to see the voting pattern in the next election. Anticipates more protests 
and Bersih activity. But Malaysians are unpredictable! A mixed lot and you 
cannot predict the outcome
Now the mood for protest has waned, but Bersih is doing a lot of campaigning, 
and is active and keeping pressure on government this way. 
Too much corruption. Degrading your own people. There is harmony, but not 
clean, fair system. Not even close to fair! This will change because of Bersih. 
When is our turn? I will join when it is our turn.
Doubt there will be Bersih for this next election. Though like an episode 
1/2/3/4 etc. and waiting for next one. Might be active before the election as 
want to bring the government down.
It's finished, as it's been proven to be a fraud, and not neutral. You can see this in 
the low turnout.
Future prospects of 
Malaysia government?
People want a change in government, but the opposition is fractured 
(PAS). Needs to unite to stand a chance of defeating Najib's party. 
Potential unification possible by Mahathir's endorsement of opposition 
(though he has a personal agenda, he can bring people together and 
knows how to do politics). In the city perhaps people would vote for 
the opposition regardless of their race.
Corruption and nepotism are big issues and the government has difficulty in 
combatting this. Most people want change and are looking forward to change in 
the next election. But very difficult to topple the government as Malaysians are 
conservative and are afraid of radical change. They seek to maintain the status 
quo. Malaysia is not a 100% democracy, more a guided democracy, but this has 
proven to work as country has made progress and developed, so there might 
not be any need to change it. But if the country isn't growing anymore then 
there is a need to change. Why not try something else? If that doesn't work we 
can change back. Need to give change a chance. Once we achieve change 
though, it is very difficult to go back. Need NGO and youth to help win. 
Opposition is not is united so difficult to change. Needs a leader (Anwar - in 
prison, Mahathir - too old).Current government worse than previous ones as 
economically poor performance. 1md scandal, nepotism, corruption. Many 
people are hopeful for change
Been no changes in the political system. People are dying for changes, people are 
going mad for change and will be quite tough for the government to maintain its 
position. All people want is to live comfortably, but this isn't possible under 
current government. Stagnating. Hard to say if there will be any change. Last 
election the government didn't have the popular vote, but the government 
always knows how to manipulate the votes. Not optimistic. 
There needs to be, and will be changes as Malays are getting more greedy and 
living costs have gone up. Political situation very important now, and need for 
real change. It comes down to the people . Changes = Bersih. Malays continue to 
support the government (red-shirts, as want to be spoon-fed and to maintain 
dominant position), but other races do not as they are fed up. Bersih isn't 
political though, just want clean elections. 2018 election - Modern Malays, 
Chinese and Indians want regime change, but government still supported by 
majority Malays. Majority. Najib will still be there, but perhaps with fewer 
seats,. No big change yet.
The opposition might come together for the election, but it is too weak and the 
government will stay. The racial divisions are too strong and people are not 
united.
Current government will remain because opposition parties are not united and 
have Mahathir who is corrupt leading them now, which doesn't bode well. 
Opinion on 1Malaysia 
programme?
White Elephant. Do not really unite people, just pay lip service to this 
and actually used to siphon off money to enrich certain groups. Divides 
3 groups more, as the dominant narrative still champions Malays. 
Acknowledges this is the Chinese perspective, and Malays might not, 
depending on their education level. 
Trying to rectify the suspicion between races. In the past we didn't need such a 
policy as people mixed organically. Everybody was united. Sound philosophy 
and well-intentioned, but the implementation is not good so we don't see a 
difference. So Malaysians support the concept and idea of the programme, but 
lose faith in it when they see how poorly it is implemented.
All these nation building programmes - their ultimate goal is to make money. Just 
a label, which is supposed to benefit all people, but doesn't really mean anything. 
Maybe if they were implemented properly they could work better.
Political gimmick, used to satisfy people and say nice things. Lip service. 
Marketing but no substance. Some patriotic people might think it works, and 
government is trying to appease these minorities. 
Works for those who watch and believe the mainstream media, and for formal 
occasions. Good initiatives but are not working. Lip service as they keep 
pushing people apart as they don't care about people.
There is a good intention but unsure about the results. It is a good concept and 
the beginning of bringing people together. It's a baby step, but still have 
UMNO/MIC/MCA which keep everything apart.
Define: Malaysian 
nationality
Of course I feel Malaysian! More so since living in Singapore, as more 
connected to Malaysian Indians and Malays than Singaporeans. Can't 
say what that is based on apart from commonality. Within Malaysia 
people see the divisions more. Feels like a 2nd class citizen (Chinese) in 
Malaysia though. Not as equally valued, and must rely on themselves 
and work harder to succeed as minimal support.
Of course I feel Malaysian, as grew up and mostly educated in Malaysia. To be 
Malaysian is to feel like you are one country, one nation, to feel progressive and 
to strive to be world class. Proud to live in one country with different ethnic 
groups, and this unity in diversity makes Malaysia unique as they have 
remained peaceful. Should feel proud! 
Yes I am. I feel it. What does that mean? Not sure. Malaysians are happy go 
lucky. Not so competitive or stressed out. Can have a good, decent simple life 
and everyone committed to make the country better. Can say 'hi' to everyone.
I feel Sabahan, not Malaysian. We are always on our own. Growing up I felt part 
of Malaysia as it was taught in school, and that East Malaysia belongs to West 
Malaysia. Malaysian identity  is happy to live in the country you were born and 
raised in, where there is no friction between religions and races, and focus on 
progress and the future. That's what school teaches us, but the reality is 
different as there is competition between the races and rampant corruption.
Malaysians know how to get along and respects others cultures and different 
races. Harmony.
Feels more Sabahan than Malaysian. Less racist, more tolerant and free there 
than in West Malaysia. E.g.okctoberfest banned in Peninsular, should bring to 
Sabah. I felt Malaysia when in the UK I guess. No, still Sabahan more than 
Malaysian, and really felt this when living in KL. It is much more mixed and 
segregated West Malaysia.
How to transcend racial 
categories?
With a different ruling party, Malaysia can grow and then other aspects 
can change too, such as the issue of non-Malays being treated like 2nd 
class citizens. The new government would know people are not happy 
and will have to do something about this.
Need unifying policies, as once introduced they have to be followed. TOP 
DOWN. Education is the key to bring about correct change. Change through 
revolution is not appropriate, no radical change. Rather through evolution and 
in a peaceful manner. 
Not sure what would need to happen to achieve this. It's all about feelings, and 
you can't force people to mix. Maybe by appealing to common humanity and 
understanding we are all the same. People are intermarrying more than before, 
so that's one way. We need to create fairness for all the races so that they are 
equal and there is no hierarchy or feelings of being superior. This could 
encourage more unity. And also most things involve races, we always have to 
label our race when we fill in forms or register for absolutely anything. It's all 
about labelling your race. Maybe we should put these labels aside and so they 
cease to be important. Stop asking for it.
These new Malays are vocal and don't care about these divisions, come as 
united. Modern Malays think we are one. Willing to forgo privileges for Malays, 
even though they are Malays as have same vision of the future and don't want 
the Malays to be the dominant group. They are the minority of Malays and are 
all of the same class - middle class. If (when) Modern Malays take over, then NEP 
can be stopped
The political landscape has to change to achieve real harmony and get rid of race 
based segregation. There would have to be no race based parties, it would have 
to be possible for an Indian or Chinese to be PM. There was a funny article that 
suggested forcing people to only marry people from another race, and forbid 
someone from marrying their own race. In this way, there would be no more 
Indian, no more Chinese, no more Malays - this categories would dissolve. It 
would be nice. But there are race relations all over the world, and people always 
want to keep their own identity. Another factor that would have to change is the 
dominance of Islam. If a female non-Muslim marries a Muslim, she has to 
convert, and her children would be Malay. This is not fair, as they are not given a 
choice (and neither is she). Would be fairer if everyone could choose their 
religion, and those kids could choose. As it is now, the Malays never have to give 
up anything and the onus is always on the other to convert, and this deters 
Chinese and Indians from marrying Malays. (example: sister married a Muslim 
and then got divorced. She converted because she had to but doesn't want to 
keep the religion now that she's divorced. She has to though. Her kids are 
Muslim too and labelled as 'Malay' rather than Sino-Dusun). A lot is to do with 
skin colour too though, as if a Japanese converted to Muslim they wouldn't get 
the 'Malay' label. Got to look the part and speak the language too, and share 
same eating habits.  The appearance has to fit Malay. Hence why the 
Indonesians get identified as Malay. E.g. our deputy PM is originally from 
Indonesia and can even still speak Javanese, but he is identified as a Malay.
